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ARTICLES 
“COUNTER-COUNTER-TERRORISM VIA 
LAWSUIT”—THE BIVENS IMPASSE 
GEORGE D. BROWN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article deals with one of the most difficult questions arising out 
of the war on terror: what to do about the victims. How should the legal 
system respond to claims of collateral damage to constitutional rights when 
the government has tilted in favor of security at the expense of liberty? The 
war on terror has already put the American legal system to a severe test, 
exacerbated by the divide between those who see the problem as essentially 
one of preserving civil liberties and those who see it as one of preserving 
national security. 
Increasingly, the system will have to grapple with suits by terrorism 
suspects who seek damages for the governmental conduct to which they 
have been subjected. The Supreme Court has already decided one such 
case; others are on their way. Apart from damages for the victims, these 
suits present the question of potential civil liability for federal officials, 
particularly those of the previous administration. Much of this litigation 
will be based on the Bivens doctrine, which permits damages actions for 
constitutional torts committed by federal officials. This Article contends 
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was coined by Richard Klingler. See Richard Klingler, The Court, the Culture Wars, and Real Wars, 30 
A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP., June 2008, at 1, 4. My colleagues Michael Cassidy and Diane Ring, as 
well as Henry Monaghan, read earlier drafts and made helpful suggestions. Special thanks to Mary Ann 
Neary of the Boston College Law Library and to Philip Cheng, Paul Marzagalli, William Monigan, and 
Stephen Smith for research and production assistance. 
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that the Bivens doctrine exists in two forms: the Marbury-rights model and 
the prudential-deferential model. The former focuses on the plaintiff and 
points toward allowing the suit to proceed. The latter focuses on the subject 
matter and leads to emphasis on protecting the government. It is closely 
related to the political question doctrine and has prevailed since the 1980s. 
Thus, war on terror Bivens plaintiffs face obstacles, but they are not 
insurmountable. The Supreme Court’s recent habeas corpus cases in the 
context of the war on terror have emphasized a heightened judicial role in 
protecting individual rights. These cases might portend a return to the 
Marbury-rights model. As an alternative, the Court may be exploring the 
possibility of a middle ground: a balancing approach to Bivens that would 
permit some suits to proceed. In war on terror suits, this approach has an 
initial appeal. It avoids the Bivens dilemma: a choice between the 
prudential-deferential model, which will generally lead to dismissal, and 
the Marbury-rights model, which points toward allowing the suit to 
proceed. The Article contends, however, that while superficially appealing, 
this balancing alternative will not work, at least in the context of the war 
on terror. The same competing values will always be present in the 
balancing process: vindication of constitutional rights and judicial 
checking of the political branches versus deference to government actions 
to fight terrorism and concern over the detrimental effects of litigation on 
those efforts. The Bivens doctrine is, in effect, at an impasse. Courts are 
faced with an either/or choice that they, rightly, may not feel competent to 
make. 
Yet the constitutional order can hardly ignore the need to strike some 
balance between individual liberty and national security. The issue of 
compensation is particularly acute. This Article contends that Congress, 
not the judiciary, should resolve the Bivens impasse. This approach would 
respond to the Supreme Court’s call for Congress to take the lead in the 
national debate over striking the balance and would be consistent with the 
prudential-deferential model’s reliance on congressional primacy in 
devising constitutional remedies. The Article concludes by considering 
steps Congress might take, including substituting governmental for 
individual liability, using a specialized court, and establishing 
administrative processes. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION—BIVENS MEETS THE WAR ON TERROR 
The war on terror has put the American legal system to a severe test. 
Issues as diverse as the legitimacy and procedures of nontraditional 
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military tribunals,1 the availability of and procedures for habeas corpus,2 
and the power of Congress over the “Great Writ”3 have generated 
substantial, widely publicized litigation. Until now, attention has focused 
on terrorism suspects who seek to block the government actions to which 
they are subjected. The most dramatic examples have been habeas corpus 
petitions seeking outright release.4 
These suits are not about to go away,5 but a new form of litigation will 
become increasingly important: damages suits claiming violations of 
constitutional and other rights brought against the federal officials who 
participated in the contested measures, either at the operational or higher 
levels. One commentator calls this phenomenon “counter-counter-terrorism 
via lawsuit.”6 High profile examples have already emerged7: the suit by 
Jose Padilla against former Justice Department official John Yoo8 and the 
damages action by Canadian citizen Maher Arar based on his 
“extraordinary rendition” to Syria.9 
A cornerstone of these suits is the Bivens doctrine, often referred to as 
the federal analogue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics11 arose out of alleged Fourth 
Amendment violations by federal law enforcement officials. The Supreme 
Court ruled that federal officials who violate individuals’ constitutional 
 
 1. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 2. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 3. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); id. at 2293 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 4. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The courts are also often involved in the 
prosecution of terrorism-related offenses. Typical are the numerous criminal enforcement actions based 
on statutes forbidding support for terrorists and terrorist organizations such as 18 U.S.C. § 2339A 
(2006), which imposes criminal liability for providing material support to terrorists. See, e.g., United 
States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2004). 
 5. The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush adopts a flexible approach to the 
availability of habeas corpus to aliens not on U.S. soil. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2267. It is likely that 
this approach will generate future litigation. 
 6. Richard Klinger, The Court, the Culture Wars, and Real War, 30 A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. 
REP., June 2008, at 1, 4.  
 7. See Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 715 (2006) 
(stating that the victims of U.S. torture “have begun to sue”). 
 8. Padilla v. Yoo, No. C 08-00035 JSW, 2009 WL 1651273 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2009). 
 9. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir.), reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 12, 2008). In 
August 2008, the Second Circuit granted Arar a rehearing en banc. Mark Hamblett, Full Court to 
Rehear Rendition Case, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 15, 2008, at 1. The argument was held on December 9, 2008. 
 10. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 585 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (“The Bivens analog to § 1983 . . . is hardly an obscure part of the Court’s 
jurisprudence.”). 
 11. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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rights can be held liable for damages.12 This holding might seem little more 
than an application of Chief Justice Marshall’s famous statement in 
Marbury v. Madison that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly 
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury.”13 Yet from the outset, the Bivens doctrine 
has contained an equally important, diametrically opposed strand: a high 
degree of judicial discretion coupled with deference to Congress—both its 
expertise in the particular subject matter of the suit and its role in making 
the basic remedial decision of whether damages are available for 
constitutional violations. Over the last two decades, the latter strand has 
prevailed. The Supreme Court has rejected the last seven attempts to 
fashion a Bivens action in new contexts.14 Commentators have declared 
Bivens moribund, if not dead.15 
In this Article, I contend that things are not so simple. The terrorism-
based cases will force the judiciary, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to 
reexamine the status of Bivens. It may well be that efforts to fashion 
damages remedies for possible constitutional violations will fail. At the 
general level, the Court’s apparent hostility to Bivens—or at least the 
Court’s emphasis on the discretionary-deferential nature of the doctrine—is 
there for all to see. At a specific level, some lower court judges have seized 
on one aspect—what might be called the “political question” dimension of 
Bivens—to justify refusals to hear cases where claims of constitutional 
violations seem strong.16 These judges may see terrorism-based Bivens 
 
 12. See id. at 395–96. 
 13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), quoted in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
 14. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537; Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); United States v. Stanley, 483 
U.S. 669 (1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). But 
see Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (accepting the availability of Bivens for First Amendment 
claims); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) (discussing the role of the exhaustion doctrine in 
prisoner Bivens suits), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, sec. 803(d), § 7(a), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 (1996). McCarthy is best seen as an example of the 
Court’s treatment of the Bivens doctrine as a given, albeit one it did not wish to extend. 
 15. E.g., Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
289, 294 (1995) (“[T]here is little left of the Bivens principle.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a 
Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 23, 26 (“[T]he best that can be said of the Bivens doctrine is that it is on life support with little 
prospect of recovery.”). See also James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy 
and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2009) (manuscript at 30, on file with 
author) (citing “recent hostility to new Bivens claims”). 
 16. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006), reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 12, 2008); Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 672–73 (D.C. 
Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (mem.). On remand the District of 
Columbia Circuit adopted Judge Brown’s position as an alternative ground for refusing to hear the suit. 
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cases as forcing them not just to evaluate individual conduct, but also to 
evaluate entire government programs in the sensitive area of national 
security.17 On the other hand, many of the cases present what might be 
called “heartland” Bivens issues—egregious conduct by law enforcement 
or similar officials.18 Even if confined to its original facts, as Justices Scalia 
and Thomas have advocated,19 the doctrine would arguably allow these 
damages actions to proceed. Its Marbury roots point in this direction. So do 
the Supreme Court’s recent terrorism cases. Thus, a rebirth of Bivens is a 
distinct possibility, as seemingly arcane points of federal jurisdiction play a 
central role in the world of counter-counter-terrorism litigation. 
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I trace the evolution of 
Bivens and its inherent duality. I contend that there is not one single model 
of Bivens, but two contrasting ones that have coexisted since the original 
decision. I label these the Marbury-rights model and the prudential-
deferential model. The former encourages constitutional damages 
litigation; the latter discourages it. The Supreme Court’s Bivens decisions 
are examined in depth in order to develop these models. Part III takes a 
preliminary look at possible war on terror constitutional damages suits. I 
focus on Arar v. Ashcroft,20 an extraordinary rendition case. That case is a 
good example of the prudential-deferential model in action and shows its 
close relationship to the political question doctrine. Part IV presents a 
proposed general analysis for future war on terror Bivens suits. It also 
considers the impact of the recent Supreme Court decisions on habeas 
corpus. These cases appear to support the Marbury-rights model but do not 
provide a definitive answer. This part also considers (and rejects) balancing 
as a possible compromise approach to the impasse. Part V concludes with a 
consideration of steps Congress might take as a way out of the Bivens 
impasse. 
The war on terror cases will force the Supreme Court to confront 
several issues. The first is whether to retain its current position on Bivens—
 
Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 17. See Rasul, 512 F.3d at 673 (“Judicial involvement in this delicate area could undermine these 
military and diplomatic efforts and lead to ‘embarrassment of our government abroad.’” (quoting Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962))). 
 18. In Malesko, Justice Stevens referred to an alleged Eighth Amendment violation by a prison 
guard as falling “in the heartland of substantive Bivens claims.” Malesko, 534 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 19. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 568 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 
(Scalia, J., concurring)) (arguing that Bivens should be limited “to the precise circumstances” it 
involved); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (same). 
 20. Arar, 532 F.3d 157. 
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the prudential-deferential model. As an alternative, it might return to the 
Marbury-rights model or seek a compromise approach that allows some 
suits to proceed.21 Deterring rogue agents is one thing, but individual 
liability for those who are protecting the nation in accordance with 
government policy should give us pause. While it would be consistent with 
our constitutional tradition for the judiciary to use Bivens constitutional tort 
actions as a means of “checking” official policy,22 there may be a lack of fit 
between the “A v. B” tort configuration of suits like the original Bivens 
case and broad challenges to government programs. Yet individual suits 
will often be the only available vehicle. They also highlight the issue of 
supervisory liability, including the potential for holding liable officials at 
the highest level. In such a case, the individual non-official-capacity suit 
becomes an attack on the policy itself. 
The Court must confront an additional issue: the extent to which its 
recent habeas corpus decisions portend a broader judicial role in the war on 
terror. The cases certainly point in this direction. In her plurality opinion in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O’Connor stated: 
While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments 
of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a 
war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it 
does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise 
their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing 
and resolving claims like those presented here.23  
Thus, a question arises as to how much this approach, with its strong tilt 
toward the Marbury-rights model, will carry over to the Bivens doctrine 
when the inevitable war on terror suits arise. 
 
 21. This possibility is discussed and rejected in Part IV.B infra. 
 22. See BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 113 (2008) (“The broad vision of judicial 
power in the overseas fight against terrorists has two interconnected sources. One involves the right of 
individuals detained to their day in court. The other involves the power of the courts themselves to 
review administrative action for compliance with legal norms the administration may be flouting.”); 
Bandes, supra note 15, at 317–19 (noting the importance of the Court’s checking function). David 
Zaring states that “[p]ersonal liability has become an important alternative to administrative procedure.” 
David Zaring, Personal Liability as Administrative Law, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 316 (2009). 
Cornelia Pillard argues that government practice concerning defense costs and possible indemnification 
has made the government “the real defendant party in interest in Bivens litigation.” Cornelia T. L. 
Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under 
Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 67 (1999). Yet the Court continues to insist that Bivens actions are aimed at the 
individual defendants. 
 23. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004). Justice O’Connor also cited Justice Murphy’s 
dissent in Korematsu v. United States. See id. (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233–34 
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting)). 
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In the end, one must ask whether Bivens suits are the best method of 
responding to the constitutional questions that the war on terror litigation 
brings before the courts. This is a hard question. The Bivens action is a 
valuable component of the legal order, even if it is used sparingly under the 
prudential-deferential model. This Article contends that precedent and 
policy argue for a generally negative answer in the war on terror context. 
This context provides a strong example of the need for judicial deference to 
the political branches and judicial recognition of the danger of a situation 
that Benjamin Wittes describes as “one in which legalisms pervasively 
hamper governmental pursuit of a goal that nearly all Americans 
support.”24 My rejection of a broad role for Bivens also rests on the view 
that war on terror litigation cannot just be shoehorned into the “law 
enforcement” model, in which a Bivens action looks like a typical police 
misconduct case. The issues raised by these actions must be viewed 
through the lenses of the intelligence and military models as well.25 On the 
other hand, I recognize that there is a real risk that constitutional violations 
will not be redressed. Furthermore, the judiciary’s checking function will 
be circumscribed in an area where it may be essential.  
This is the Bivens impasse that confronts the courts and that the courts 
may not be able to resolve. One approach would be for Congress to pass 
legislation to provide non-Bivens relief to those aggrieved by actions 
against them as terrorism suspects.26 Indeed, the ultimate impact of Bivens 
suits may be to prod Congress into actions that reflect its view on how best 
to strike the balance between individual liberty and national security and 
that represent a more assertive congressional role in the war on terror. 
Wittes writes that Congress “has sat on its hands and refused to assert its 
own proper role in designing a coherent legal structure for the war; to this 
day, America’s national legislature continues to avoid addressing the 
questions only it can usefully answer.”27 Wittes views both the executive 
and the judiciary as incapable of developing “a stable long-term 
architecture for a war that defies all of the usual norms of war. The only 
institution capable of delivering such a body of law is the Congress of the 
 
 24. WITTES, supra note 22, at 150. 
 25. See, e.g., AMOS N. GUIORA, FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERTERRORISM 27–28 (2008) 
(discussing the criminal, intelligence, and war models for shaping counterterrorist policy). 
 26. See generally Seamon, supra note 7, at 757–62 (emphasizing the possibility of holding the 
United States, as well as individual officials, liable, at least in the torture context). This Article 
discusses alternative possibilities for compensating aggrieved suspects in Part V infra. 
 27. WITTES, supra note 22, at 8. But see infra text accompanying notes 303–06 (noting that 
“Congress has enacted a broad array of statutes to deal with terrorism, both before and after September 
11, 2001”). 
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United States . . . .”28 
II.  BIVENS—DUALITY FROM THE OUTSET 
A.  THE ORIGINAL DECISION AND THE TWO EXCEPTIONS 
The plaintiff in Bivens sought damages from federal narcotics agents 
based on an alleged warrantless search and seizure in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.29 The Supreme Court’s 1971 decision, by a 6-3 
margin, gave an affirmative answer to the previously unresolved question 
of whether a damages remedy was available in such a case.30 Justice 
Brennan’s majority opinion treated the case as somewhat unremarkable, 
dismissing possible federalism issues,31 and making the Marbury-based 
assertion that the fact “[t]hat damages may be obtained for injuries 
consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials 
should hardly come as a surprising proposition.”32 
He brushed aside the dissenters’ suggestion that congressional 
authorization of such a remedy was necessary.33 He quoted Bell v. Hood to 
the effect that “it is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been 
invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such 
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the 
wrong done.”34 However, in the course of his analysis he posited two 
exceptions that might suffice to take away the judicially created remedy. 
Justice Brennan first noted that “[t]he present case involves no special 
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by 
Congress.”35 He then noted that “we have here no explicit congressional 
declaration that persons injured by a federal officer’s violation of the 
 
 28. WITTES, supra note 22, at 10. 
 29. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389–90 
(1971). 
 30. See id. at 388. 
 31. See id. at 391–95. 
 32. Id. at 395. See also id. at 397 (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right 
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” (quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803))). 
 33. See id. at 396 (“Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its 
enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation.”). Writing in dissent, 
both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black contended that the Court could not authorize a damages 
remedy absent explicit congressional authorization. See, e.g., id. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task—as 
we do not.”). 
 34. Id. at 396 (majority opinion) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
 35. Id. 
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Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but 
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of 
Congress.”36 
The second exception is the more straightforward of the two. The 
notion that Congress has a role equal, if not superior, to the courts in 
fashioning remedies for constitutional wrongs seems unremarkable. The 
enactment of § 1983 and related statutes37 is a clear example. The only 
serious uncertainty created by the exception is whether there might be a 
judicial role in evaluating the effectiveness of any remedies Congress did 
create. Perhaps the most important point about the second exception is that 
deference to Congress is explicit. 
The first exception presents textual and conceptual difficulties. It 
refers to special factors counseling hesitation “in the absence of affirmative 
action by Congress.” What does this mean? The most logical reading is that 
the Court is already on weak ground in fashioning a damages remedy 
without congressional authorization; the presence of special factors would 
make that ground even weaker, which would counsel hesitation. The main 
problem with this reading is that it would go far toward accepting the 
dissents’ premise38 that congressional authorization was necessary in the 
first place. Perhaps sensing this weakness, Justice Brennan tried to rewrite 
the sentence in a later case by inserting the word “even” in front of “in the 
absence of affirmative action by Congress.”39 But this suggests a type of 
congressional action that is different from congressional authorization of a 
judicial remedy. Instead, it suggests action like that evoked in the second 
exception: congressional provision of alternative remedies. Thus, the first 
exception would ask not, “Should some factor(s) make us hesitate since we 
are already on weak ground?” but rather, “Is there some reason for 
hesitating even though Congress has not provided an alternative to what the 
plaintiff seeks?” The latter inquiry diverts focus from the basic question of 
judicial authority. There is, of course, a way out of this tangle: simply to 
ignore the last eight words of the exception and to focus on the judicial 
role. Several courts, including the Supreme Court, have done just that. The 
question then becomes whether the case presents special factors counseling 
 
 36. Id. at 397. 
 37. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (providing for awarding attorney’s fees). 
 38. E.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s creation of a 
remedy was “an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give us”). 
 39. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 435 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also 
George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs—Have the Bivens Dissenters 
Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 272 (1989). 
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hesitation.40 
Two points should be made about this reading. First, there are distinct 
echoes of the political question doctrine,41 at least in some of its prudential 
formulations.42 Second, whether or not there is a prudential political 
question doctrine, the first Bivens exception strongly suggests a high degree 
of judicial discretion in determining the availability of damages for 
constitutional violations by federal officials. The first exception points 
away from a Marbury-like strict linkage between rights and remedies,43 
and toward a degree of judicial discretion, which obviously includes the 
power to deny a remedy. The outline of the Bivens doctrine that seems to 
emerge from the decision and the two exceptions might be described in the 
following terms: (1) a presumption of the availability of damages relief 
against federal officials for constitutional violations (which a court has 
inherent power to award); coupled with (2) discretion not to award that 
relief (if special factors counseling hesitation are present); and (3) an 
overriding power in Congress to negate that relief, at least by providing an 
alternative that Congress deems equally effective. In sum, the Bivens 
majority opinion points resolutely in two directions.44 
Justice Harlan’s important concurrence in Bivens is devoted mainly to 
countering the dissents’ arguments that the Court lacked power to grant a 
damages remedy without congressional authorization.45 He pointed in part 
 
 40. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983). 
 41. The last four factors in Baker v. Carr provide examples of elements of political questions: 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual 
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Any one of these could constitute a special factor counseling 
hesitation. See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 
1117, 1146, 1150, 1152 (1989) (discussing the elements of the political question doctrine in Bivens 
cases). 
 42. Erwin Chemerinsky states: 
 The political question doctrine might be treated as constitutional if it is thought to be 
based on separation of powers or textual commitments to other branches of government. On 
the other hand, the doctrine is prudential if it reflects the Court’s concerns about preserving 
judicial credibility and limiting the role of an unelected judiciary in a democratic society. 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 134 (3d ed. 2006). 
 43. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402 n.3 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing the “jurisprudential thought” 
at the time of Marbury that linked rights and remedies). 
 44. See Brown, supra note 39, at 270; Nichol, supra note 41, at 1129 (discussing “judicial 
ambivalence about the validity of the entire Bivens enterprise”). 
 45. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I am of the opinion that federal courts 
do have the power to award damages for violation of ‘constitutionally protected interests’ . . . .”). 
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to “the presumed availability of federal equitable relief”46 and contended 
that the constitutional source of the rights asserted argued strongly for a 
judicial role in remedying them.47 There are strong echoes of Marbury in 
his opinion, such as the assertion that “the judiciary has a particular 
responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional interests such as 
those embraced by the Fourth Amendment.”48 
A particularly significant aspect of Justice Harlan’s opinion is his 
emphasis on the policymaking nature of the remedial decision.49 He drew 
heavily on the Court’s approach to implied statutory rights of action 
exemplified by J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.50 Borak stood for the general 
proposition that courts can vindicate federal policies embodied in 
substantive law without the need for “express authorization of a damage 
remedy.”51 With respect to constitutional remedial questions, he stated that 
“the range of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as 
broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an 
express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.”52 
Justice Harlan’s opinion certainly looks at first blush a lot like the 
majority’s, which, for example, also cited Borak.53 Like the majority, his 
analysis reflects a Marbury-based view of the legal system.54 An important 
distinction is that Justice Harlan relied far more heavily on the possibility 
of implying rights of action from statutes as justification for judicial 
fashioning of constitutional damages actions.55 The two practices are quite 
different, however. The Constitution not only occupies a higher position in 
the legal order, but it also does not, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, 
“partake of the prolixity of a legal code.”56 Thus, one might not expect to 
find in a constitution the same specificity as to remedies that could, and 
perhaps should, be included in a statute. The interpretation and application 
of a constitution is a substantially different exercise from the interpretation 
 
 46. Id. at 404. 
 47. Id. at 403, 407. 
 48. Id. at 407. 
 49. See id. at 403–04. 
 50. See id. at 402 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)). 
 51. Id. See also Borak, 377 U.S. at 433 (stating that under certain circumstances “it is the duty of 
the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional 
purpose”). 
 52. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. at 397 (majority opinion). 
 54. See id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 55. See id. at 403–04.  
 56. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). See also Bandes, supra note 
15, at 315. 
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and application of statutes. If Congress wants a particular remedy, it can 
provide for it expressly, rather than rely on courts to imply it. A post-Borak 
Court might decide to curtail sharply the practice of implying rights of 
action from statutes. There is substantial evidence that this has happened.57 
Linking the Bivens constitutional action so strongly to implied statutory 
rights creates the real risk that a collapse of the link could carry Bivens with 
it.58 
By this point it should be apparent that war on terror Bivens plaintiffs 
will be relying on a doctrine that is beset by weaknesses and uncertainties 
of the sort that would not exist if a federal statutory analogue to § 1983 
were available.59 The Bivens doctrine faces two key problems that make it 
vulnerable. The first is the persistent view that it is illegitimate, given its 
lack of congressional authorization.60 The second is that the exceptions are 
capable of swallowing the rule.61 A Supreme Court bent on narrowing the 
decision, rather than overruling it, would have little difficulty finding some 
form of special factors counseling hesitation, or perhaps a congressionally 
created alternative remedy. After an initial period of growth and apparent 
acceptance of Bivens, the second form of vulnerability appears to have 
become the driving force. 
Although I find the above analysis helpful and plausible—and have 
indeed contributed to it62—I wish to outline an alternative way of looking 
at Bivens. There is not simply one form of what the Supreme Court has 
called “the Bivens model.”63 There are two models. I label the first the 
“Marbury-rights” model. It is obviously present in the original decision 
and, particularly, in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Davis v. Passman,64 
discussed below. This relatively straightforward view of constitutional torts 
 
 57. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 397–400 (5th ed. 2007); RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 781–93 (5th ed. 2003). 
 58. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 15 (manuscript at 18).  
 59. See generally Seamon, supra note 7 (claiming that current law is inadequate and that a 
federal statutory analogue to § 1983 should be created). 
 60. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 32–34 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 61. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 15, at 296 (noting the presence of “seeds of deference to the 
judgment of the political branches” in the original opinion). 
 62. See Brown, supra note 39. 
 63. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). Tribe appears to accept the existence of one 
model, which lasted at least until Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), but may have ended with 
Wilkie. See Tribe, supra note 15, at 66–67. A student comment on Wilkie also describes a model 
embodied in that case, which gave “force to the concepts of a limited judicial role and deference to the 
political branches” and constrained itself to “ensuring minimally necessary protection for constitutional 
rights.” The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 190–91 (2007). 
 64. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
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builds on the judiciary’s classic role as interpreter and enforcer of the 
Constitution, the presence of a plaintiff with a constitutional claim, and the 
presence of a court with jurisdiction to hear it.65 The court reaches the 
merits because hearing such suits is an important part of its Article III 
business. 
I label the second model the “prudential-deferential” model. It can be 
found in nascent form in the two original exceptions and in Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence. However, my identification of this model also reflects what 
has happened over nearly three decades. The Supreme Court has turned 
down every opportunity to expand Bivens to come before it since 1983.66 
The concept of special factors counseling hesitation has been central to the 
development of this model. The factors usually turn out to be some 
combination of Congress’s expertise in the area of the suit’s subject matter, 
particularly if Congress has acted, and its presumed expertise in providing 
for enforcement of federal law, including the Constitution. Here, we see 
deference at work, leading to the conclusion that the judiciary should not 
participate in the determination. The model also has a prudential 
component, which the Supreme Court has referred to as “judgment.”67 
I have used the term “prudential” to capture not only the model’s 
discretionary nature, but also to emphasize the public law dimension of the 
Bivens action. Under the prudential model, the Court takes into 
consideration the best method of advancing the constitutional order in the 
context of a proposed damages action. In Justice Harlan’s terms, it makes 
policy. As Chemerinsky puts it in describing the general concept of 
prudential doctrines, “[A]lthough the Constitution permits federal court 
 
 65. See id. at 236. Tribe states that “the core premise of Bivens [is] that the importance of 
constitutional rights justified implying a cause of action directly from the Constitution.” Tribe, supra 
note 15, at 25. See also Bandes, supra note 15, at 311 (“Bivens is a short step from Marbury. To uphold 
the rights of individuals before the Court, the Court must prevent encroachment on those rights by the 
political branches. More than a century and a half after Marbury, Bivens ratified judicial enforcement of 
the limits on governmental excess. The use of the Constitution as a sword; the willingness to enforce 
limits, which is the animating principle behind Bivens, rests on the notion of positive checks on 
government espoused in Marbury. It is inconsistent with a version of the separation of powers doctrine 
which views the tripartite functions as sharply separated, and the judiciary as passive in the face of 
incursions by the political branches.” (footnotes omitted)). For a similar exposition of the model, see 
Nichol, supra note 41, at 1153. 
 66. See supra note 14. 
 67. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. Nichol questions the propriety of “judicial ‘discretion’ to grant or 
withhold relief.” See Nichol, supra note 41, at 1150. He cites the earlier debate on prudential restraint 
between Martin Redish and David Shapiro. Id. (citing Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant 
Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 
UCLA L. REV. 329, 349–60 (1988); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543 (1985)). 
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adjudication, the Court has decided that in certain instances wise policy 
militates against judicial review.”68 
The contrast with the Marbury-rights model is clear. Here is how the 
Court recently described its approach to Bivens actions: 
[W]e have . . . held that any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed 
constitutional violation has to represent a judgment about the best way to 
implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement 
no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected 
interest, and in most instances we have found a Bivens remedy 
unjustified.69 
At the moment, the prudential-deferential model is in the ascendancy. 
It poses a serious obstacle to war on terror Bivens actions. The model 
encourages a court to focus not on the rights asserted but on the 
governmental activity in question, Congress’s competence in dealing with 
it, and the negative consequences of judicial “intrusion” into the area. It is 
possible, however, that plaintiffs seeking to bring war on terror Bivens 
actions will overcome the obstacles the prudential-deferential model 
presents. Indeed, those actions may breathe new life into the Marbury-
rights model. Finding a way out of the Bivens impasse presents the legal 
system with a puzzle. The best way to begin to solve this puzzle is to trace 
the history of Bivens. 
B.  THE HEYDAY OF THE MARBURY-RIGHTS MODEL: DAVIS AND CARLSON 
Davis v. Passman70 was the first Supreme Court decision to apply 
Bivens. The divisions within the Court showed that the doctrine faced the 
inevitable growing pains.71 Davis extended Bivens to a substantive due 
process/equal protection claim by a former congressional staff member.72 
Perhaps aware of the analytical trap discussed above,73 Justice Brennan’s 
 
 68. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 42, at 50. 
 69. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. In an important recent article, John Preis makes a similar distinction. 
He describes the Court’s task as “accommodat[ing] two competing principles.” John F. Preis, Alternate 
State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723, 760 (2008). He labels the first principle 
as “the very essence of civil liberty” and refers to the second principle as the “separation of powers.” Id. 
Unlike the analysis presented here—one that views the two principles as always in potential conflict, 
with the exceptions fortifying the non-Marbury approach—Preis views the exceptions as an effort to 
harmonize the two approaches. See id. at 760–62. 
 70. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 71. There were three separate dissents, with a total of four Justices dissenting. 
 72. For a discussion of the facts, see Davis, 442 U.S. at 230. The case was complicated by the 
congressman’s defeat after the employee dismissal that had prompted the case. See id. at 231 n.4. 
 73. See supra text accompanying notes 55–58. 
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majority opinion specifically uncoupled the Bivens remedy from statutory 
implied rights of action.74 He relied on the foundational decisions of 
Marbury and McCulloch to establish that the Constitution “speaks . . . with 
a majestic simplicity”75 and that “[o]ne of ‘its important objects’ is the 
designation of rights.”76 The judiciary is “the primary means through which 
these rights may be enforced.”77 The availability of Bivens relief thus 
became a form of presumption in this statement of the Marbury-rights 
model.78 
Justice Brennan then turned to the two exceptions. The fact that the 
plaintiff’s former employer was a congressman might present special 
factors, but they extended no further than the protections afforded him by 
the Speech or Debate Clause.79 Although he did not link it to the special 
factors exception, Justice Brennan had previously rejected the possibility 
that the political question doctrine was relevant.80 This left the second 
Bivens exception, but there was no explicit prohibition against judicial 
remedies for those in the plaintiff’s position, nor had Congress created 
equally effective alternative remedies.81 Thus, in the end, the Bivens 
question was relatively straightforward. 
Davis can be seen as an acceptance of Bivens as the general 
framework for constitutional tort claims. In particular, it was a victory for 
the Marbury-rights model, but the fact that four Justices dissented indicated 
disagreement within the Court over how to apply Bivens.82 Much of the 
disagreement focused on the role of the Speech or Debate Clause on the 
facts of the case, given the former congressman’s status. Justice Powell put 
forth an early version of the prudential-deferential model. He invoked the 
judicial discretion emphasized in Justice Harlan’s Bivens concurrence, and 
treated as “settled that where discretion exists, a variety of factors rooted in 
 
 74. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 240–42. 
 75. Id. at 241. 
 76. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 242. Tribe states that “powerful principles underlying the Constitution itself give 
rise to a strong presumption that violations of federal constitutional rights are redressable by appropriate 
relief in the federal courts.” Tribe, supra note 15, at 70. Justice Brennan indicated an exception for 
political questions. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 242. 
 79. See id. at 246 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.1). 
 80. See id. at 235 n.11. However, he based his political question analysis on the reach of the 
Speech or Debate Clause. 
 81. See id. at 246–48. 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the problem was one of respect for 
a coequal branch, not the Speech or Debate Clause); id. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 254 n.3 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
BROW8 10/19/2009 8:57 PM 
2009] COUNTER-COUNTER-TERRORISM 857 
 
the Constitution may lead a federal court to refuse to entertain an otherwise 
properly presented constitutional claim.”83 The dissenting opinions were 
not necessarily a rejection of Bivens. Rather, they stressed that reasons may 
exist for denying the action in particular cases, whether labeled separation 
of powers, special factors, or discretion. 
In Carlson v. Green,84 the focus was on the second exception. Carlson 
involved a suit against federal prison officials based on the death of a 
prisoner. The Court viewed the plaintiff as also able to sue the government 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).85 Before getting to either 
exception, Justice Brennan, again writing for the majority, presented the 
Bivens doctrine in presumptive terms that reflected the Marbury-rights 
model, saying, “The victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent 
have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite 
the absence of any statute conferring such a right.”86 He then stated the two 
exceptions but disposed quickly of the first. The defendants had no special 
status in the government, and qualified immunity was available to prevent 
any inhibition of their performance of their duties.87 The second exception 
was trickier. Congress had provided persons like the plaintiff with some 
remedy. Justice Brennan concluded that Congress intended the FTCA and 
Bivens remedies to be parallel.88 Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, 
concurred in the result but again criticized the rule-like approach to Bivens 
as eliminating necessary judicial discretion.89 He also criticized the Court 
for apparently requiring magic words that a particular remedy was a 
substitute for Bivens.90 Only Justice Rehnquist’s lengthy dissent questioned 
the legitimacy of Bivens itself.91 Thus, within a decade of the original 
decision, one could conclude that the Bivens doctrine was an established 
component of the legal landscape. Individual Justices might differ over 
how to apply it—specifically, what the breadth of the exceptions was.92 
 
 83. Id. at 253 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell emphasized “comity toward an equal 
and coordinate branch of government.” Id. at 253. 
 84. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 85. Id. at 20. 
 86. Id. at 18. 
 87. Id. at 19.  
 88. See id. at 19–20. 
 89. See id. at 25–26 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 28 (questioning the majority opinion’s 
“absolute” language). 
 90. See id. at 27. Overall Justice Powell’s opinion indicates that judicial discretion should 
frequently be exercised to deny a Bivens remedy.  
 91. See id. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger stated that he would be 
“prepared to join an opinion giving effect to Bivens,” which he thought was “wrongly decided.” Id. at 
30 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 92. In Carlson, Justice Powell criticized the Court for not giving guidance on the meaning of the 
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Still, they were exceptions within the overall framework of the Marbury-
rights model. However, it took less than a decade for the exceptions to 
largely swallow the rule, and for the prudential-deferential model to replace 
the Marbury-rights model as the dominant mode of analysis. 
C.  THE 1980S RETRENCHMENT 
War on terror Bivens actions will confront a very different doctrine 
from that in the cases described above, which presumed that constitutional 
damages actions should go forward. In the 1980s, the Court rejected the 
availability of a Bivens action in all four cases that came before it.93 In 
Chappell v. Wallace, it held that servicemen could not sue superior officers 
for racial discrimination.94 Bush v. Lucas denied the possibility of Bivens 
relief for a federal employee who claimed violation of his First Amendment 
rights.95 United States v. Stanley also involved the military; it denied 
Bivens relief to servicemen who alleged they had unknowingly been 
administered LSD.96 Schweiker v. Chilicky rejected a Bivens action by 
social security disability benefits recipients who claimed violation of due 
process in the termination of benefits.97 I do not propose to examine each 
case in detail, but to extract from them common themes which explain both 
the 1980s retrenchment and the current doctrinal status of the constitutional 
damages action. 
These cases are often described as refusals to extend Bivens into new 
contexts.98 However, the term “context” can make this description 
imprecise. It might mean the field in which the government has acted, the 
defendant sought to be held liable, or the constitutional provision invoked. 
Although the “refusal to extend” description is somewhat helpful, I think it 
 
special factors exception. See id. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 93. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 
(1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 94. Chappell, 462 U.S. 296. 
 95. Bush, 462 U.S. 367. 
 96. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669. 
 97. Schweiker, 487 U.S. 412. 
 98. “Since Carlson we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or 
new category of defendants.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001). The Court also 
referred to its “caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any new context, a caution consistently 
and repeatedly recognized for three decades.” Id. at 74. An alternative phraseology would describe 
these cases as refusals to expand the availability of the Bivens remedy. The Court’s most recent decision 
involving a Bivens claim is Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The majority opinion repeated the view that “the Court 
has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability ‘to any new context or any new category of defendants.’” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68). Although Iqbal did 
not directly present the question of the availability of a Bivens claim, the Court indicated it would take a 
negative approach to at least a portion of plaintiff’s Bivens contentions. See id. at 1948–49. 
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is more helpful to view the 1980s cases as a period of retrenchment, one in 
which the notion of special factors came to play a greatly expanded role, 
and in which the prudential-deferential model became dominant. The Court 
not only fastened on special factors as a way of limiting Bivens, but the 
Justices also emphasized Congress’s role—both what it had done and had 
the authority to do—as itself a special factor in a way that cast doubt on the 
original premise of Bivens: that the judiciary could proceed to fashion a 
constitutional damages remedy without authorization from Congress.99 
These decisions also cast doubt on the Marbury-rights presumption of the 
availability of such a remedy. 
There are several aspects of this development that merit particular 
attention. As noted, the Court’s general approach was to place more 
emphasis on the presence of special factors counseling hesitation. It also 
tended to conflate the two original exceptions by treating the available 
remedies—or Congress’s ability to create a remedy—as a special factor.100 
The Court examined both the remedial issue and the underlying 
government activity—sometimes referred to as “the context”101—to see if 
the nature of that activity counseled against judicial intrusion. 
Chappell is a good example. The Court began with a general 
statement of the Bivens rule, as well as of the exception imposed when 
special factors are present.102 It found such a factor in the “peculiar and 
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors.”103 The Court also stated 
that “[b]efore a Bivens remedy may be fashioned, therefore, a court must 
take into account any ‘special factors counselling hesitation.’”104 Clearly 
related to this inquiry were both the existence of possible remedies—“a 
comprehensive internal system of justice”105—and Congress’s general 
authority over the military, conferred in several articles of the 
Constitution.106 The Court went beyond these considerations to adumbrate 
the notions of lack of judicial competence and the undesirability of judicial 
“intrusion” into military affairs.107 The specific holding of Chappell was 
 
 99. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 442 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 100. See Bandes, supra note 15, at 297 (“The Bush decision conflated the two exceptions, so that 
the existence of a statute was itself a factor counseling hesitation.”); Nichol, supra note 41, at 1125 
(describing the Court as having merged the two exceptions). 
 101. E.g., Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 426. 
 102. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983). 
 103. Id. at 300 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)). 
 104. Id. at 298 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 377 (1983)). 
 105. Id. at 302. The Court also noted the role of the Board for the Correction of Naval Records. Id. 
at 303. 
 106. Id. at 301. 
 107. Id. at 305 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 
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that, “[t]aken together, the unique disciplinary structure of the Military 
Establishment and Congress’s activity in the field constitute ‘special 
factors’ which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted 
military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior officers.”108 
One can find similar reasoning in Bush, which cited both the context 
in the sense of subject matter, described as “federal personnel policy,”109 
and the complex scheme of rights and remedies available to civil servants, 
which the Court described as “comprehensive” and “elaborate.”110 The 
concurring opinion by Justices Marshall and Blackmun also illustrated the 
conflation point by agreeing that there were special factors, but that a 
different case would be presented if there was no “comprehensive scheme 
that was specifically designed to provide full compensation to civil service 
employees who are discharged or disciplined in violation of their First 
Amendment rights.”111 
Schweiker focused on remedies.112 The Court emphasized the fact that 
Congress had created extensive remedies in “the design of a massive and 
complex welfare benefits program.”113 These remedies would not extend to 
the plaintiff’s constitutional claims. The Court, however, introduced a form 
of “silence of Congress” approach, finding in the remedial scheme an 
indication “that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent.”114 Thus, 
special factors might include what Congress has done, what it has not done, 
its authority over the area,115 or the context in which Bivens relief was 
sought. 
Clearly, the notion of special factors counseling hesitation had 
assumed a dominant role by the end of the 1980s. An important additional 
 
187 (1962)). 
 108. Id. at 304. 
 109. Bush, 462 U.S. at 380–81. 
 110. Id. at 388. 
 111. Id. at 390 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 112. The Court does, however, rely in part on the military decisions. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 
487 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1988). 
 113. Id. at 429. 
 114. Id. at 423. 
 115. As Justice Brennan pointed out in United States v. Stanley: “If a Bivens action were 
precluded any time Congress possessed a constitutional grant of authority to act in a given area, there 
would be no Bivens.” United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 707 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The 
Court responded to Justice Brennan’s point by denying “that all matters within congressional power are 
exempt from Bivens” and particularly emphasizing “the number of Clauses” devoted to military affairs. 
Id. at 682 (majority opinion). It is not clear, however, that this distinction will hold up; rather, the 
authorization to deal with a subject could lead to a form of competence that in turn leads to a special 
factor. 
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question remained: Could the context, in the sense of subject matter, ever 
be enough by itself to constitute a special factor?116 The language of the 
exception suggests it could, as do the possible echoes of the political 
question doctrine. In Stanley, the Court suggested an affirmative answer. At 
one point, the majority stated that neither the adequacy nor even the 
existence of a remedy was relevant to the analysis.117 “The ‘special factor’ 
that ‘counsels hesitation’ is not the fact that Congress has chosen to afford 
some manner of relief in the particular case, but the fact that 
congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is 
inappropriate.”118 Taken literally, this analysis could open up a large 
number of contexts in which Bivens actions are inappropriate—the 
damages equivalent of political questions.119 Of course, it may be that 
context is never considered in isolation since Congress is always 
potentially available to address remedial issues related to any subject 
within federal power. 
For the purposes of this Article, the subject matter of Stanley makes 
the issue particularly timely. Of all the Bivens cases, Stanley is factually 
closest to the type of situation likely to arise in war on terror litigation.120 
Indeed, Justice Brennan twice referred to the government’s arguments as 
invoking “national security.”121 Overall, the 1980s decisions seriously 
undermined the Marbury-rights model of Bivens. Later cases built on these 
decisions, not on Bivens. 
D.  THE “NONEXTENSION” CASES—FEDERAL AGENCIES AND PRIVATE 
CONTRACTORS 
The notion of context is admittedly ambiguous.122 For example, the 
Court did not deny a Bivens remedy because of the constitutional claim 
asserted. The denials rested on an increased importance of the two 
 
 116. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 426–27 (rejecting the notion of context as enough by itself to 
deny a Bivens claim). But see infra text accompanying notes 117–19. 
 117. See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683. 
 118. Id. (alterations omitted). 
 119. It is significant that the Court in Chappell discussed Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), 
in which judicial supervision of a state’s National Guard was rejected as a political question. See 
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1983). 
 120. Stanley alleged that he had been administered LSD without his knowledge as part of a 
military study. See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671–72. Justice O’Connor, citing the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals, stated in her dissent that such experimentation “simply cannot be considered a part of the 
military mission.” Id. at 709–10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 689, 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also referred to the Nuremberg 
proceedings. See id. at 687. 
 122. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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exceptions—joined together under a generalized rubric of special factors 
counseling hesitation.123 Two subsequent cases continued this trend and 
represent a form of “context” broadly defined. They rest largely on the 
nature of the defendants sued, and represent applications of what the Court 
called the “logic of Bivens.”124 
In FDIC v. Meyer, the plaintiff sued a federal agency, in part under 
Bivens, on a Fifth Amendment due process claim for loss of 
employment.125 A unanimous Court rejected the suit, characterizing it as an 
attempt to “expand the category of defendants against whom Bivens-type 
actions may be brought.”126 Justice Thomas’s opinion analyzed the attempt 
as contrary to the logic of Bivens for two reasons. First, the plaintiff was 
attempting to circumvent the invocation of qualified immunity by 
individual defendants; yet the Court recognized that such immunity was a 
key element of Bivens, contemplated in the original decision,127 because it 
delineates the line between conduct that should be deterred and conduct 
that is constitutionally acceptable, or at least was acceptable when engaged 
in.128 Deterrence is an essential aspect of Bivens. “Under [the plaintiff’s 
proposal] the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.”129 
Thus, Justice Thomas could portray himself as defending Bivens while 
denying its availability. However, his second reason for denial is in the 
spirit of the 1980s cases. He identified a special factor counseling 
hesitation. In this case it was the “potentially enormous financial burden for 
the Federal Government” that direct actions against agencies could bring 
about.130 In this respect, Meyer takes us back to the original special factors 
analysis of Bivens itself, which cited “federal fiscal policy” as such a 
factor.131 However, Meyer takes a broad view of federal fiscal policy, 
including within it judicial actions that open the door to large liabilities. 
 
 123. As noted, the statement of the first exception was sometimes shortened to omit reference to 
Congress, suggesting a form of independent judicial discretion along the lines of the political question 
doctrine. However, the Court also relied heavily on Congress’s authority and role. 
 124. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994). 
 125. See id. at 473–74 (discussing the federal policy of terminating the employment of a failed 
institution’s senior management). 
 126. Id. at 484. 
 127. Id. at 484 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 397 (1971)). 
 128. See generally Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. 
Ct. 808 (2009) (outlining general rules of immunity). The Court revised the Saucier approach to 
determining immunity in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
 129. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485. 
 130. Id. at 486. 
 131. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947)). 
Fiscal policy concerns were not present in Bivens itself. See id. 
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Justice Thomas saw this as a decision for Congress to make, but one could 
surely argue that under the spirit of Bivens, it was also one for the Court to 
make, at least in the first instance. After all, Congress could change the 
rule. 
Here we see the prudential dimension of the prudential-deferential 
model at work. Prudence suggests hesitation before imposing a large 
liability on the government. Such a step could have extensive and 
damaging consequences, not all of which are apparent in a particular case 
before a court. A Marbury-rights advocate would contend that these 
concerns are irrelevant; the court must enforce the Constitution at the 
behest of an aggrieved citizen. The advocate of the competing model, 
however, invokes deference at this point. There is another body—
Congress—with greater expertise in the underlying subject matter (defined 
as federal fiscal policy and possible governmental liabilities) and equal, if 
not greater, capacity to fashion constitutional remedies. For proponents of 
this model, the weakness of the original Bivens decision (and the generative 
force of the special factors exception) lies in the fact that Congress has not 
spoken. 
The line between the two models was sharply drawn in Correction 
Services Corp. v. Malesko,132 a suit by a former federal prisoner against the 
corporation running the facility in which he was held.133 Although a Bivens 
action of this type would resemble Carlson v. Green134 in some respects, 
the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision refused to allow it. The majority relied 
heavily on Meyer and the 1980s cases, stating, “Since Carlson we have 
consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new 
category of defendants.”135 The Court discussed issues of deterrence and 
alternative remedies136 but seemed equally concerned with maintaining a 
limited role for Bivens. It referred to “caution toward extending Bivens 
remedies into any new context, a caution consistently and repeatedly 
recognized for three decades.”137 The dissenters saw the case as a threat to 
Bivens itself.138 Justice Stevens described the doctrine as “a well-
 
 132. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 133. See id. at 63–65. The facts appear to represent an example of the increasingly important 
policies of outsourcing and/or privatizing governmental functions. 
 134. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 135. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68. 
 136. See id. at 70–73. 
 137. Id. at 74. 
 138. See id. at 82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “the driving force behind the Court’s 
decision is a disagreement with the holding in Bivens itself”). 
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recognized part of our law for over 30 years.”139 He even attempted to use 
the majority’s deference to Congress against it, arguing that “Congress has 
effectively ratified the Bivens remedy.”140 For the majority, however, the 
remedy was treated as almost discredited. 
E.  WILKIE V. ROBBINS 
Wilkie v. Robbins141 presented a complicated and somewhat novel set 
of facts. A landowner claimed that the Bureau of Land Management 
engaged in a long-term campaign of harassment against him (a “death by a 
thousand cuts”142) in order to force him to grant the Bureau an easement 
that it had allowed to expire.143 He contended that a Bivens action should 
lie, on the theory that the government’s harassing conduct constituted an 
attempt to “take” the easement in violation of the Fifth Amendment.144 By 
a 7-2 margin, the Court held that Bivens relief was not available. 
I wish to focus initially on Justice Souter’s treatment of the Bivens 
methodology: it shows how far the Court has moved from its original mode 
of analysis. He noted the affirmative decisions on relief in Bivens, Davis, 
and Carlson, but described the Court’s general approach in the following 
key passage: 
[W]e have also held that any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed 
constitutional violation has to represent a judgment about the best way to 
implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement 
no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected 
interest, and in most instances we have found a Bivens remedy 
unjustified.145 
He discussed, and transposed, the two exceptions as the steps that 
would guide the remedial inquiry. A court first asks whether the fact of 
existing, alternative processes for protecting the asserted interest “amounts 
to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a 
new and freestanding remedy in damages.”146 But even if the answer is no, 
 
 139. Id. at 83. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 142. Id. at 555. 
 143. See id. at 541–49 (describing the facts of the case). Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority 
for giving a “restrained account” of the allegations. Id. at 570 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
 144. The Fifth Amendment provides in part, “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. 
 145. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. 
 146. Id. 
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“a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment: ‘the federal courts must make 
the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law 
tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling 
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.’”147 
Taken in its entirety, this description of the Bivens process is 
remarkable. The Marbury-based presumption of judicial relief for injuries 
is gone, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent.148 The remedy itself 
seems somewhat denigrated, repeatedly described as “freestanding”149 and 
generally unavailable. Most significant is the emphasis on judicial 
judgment, indicating a wide range of discretion in determining whether or 
not special factors are present. The opinion clearly seemed to contemplate a 
form of balancing. It described the step-two analysis as one of “weighing 
reasons for and against the creation of a new cause of action.”150 Deference 
to Congress also made an appearance at the end of the Court’s analysis. 
Congress, the majority stated, should be the source of any new remedy for 
the conduct complained of.151 “‘Congress is in a far better position than a 
court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation’ against those 
who act on the public’s behalf.”152 Thus, the main role for judicial 
discretion would appear to be denying Bivens remedies in any doubtful or 
even close case. 
As for the facts of the case, the majority found Wilkie to be on the 
doubtful side. It came close to denying Bivens relief based on the original 
second factor. The plaintiff had a variety of remedies for the government’s 
acts of harassment, including defending himself in a dubious criminal case 
it brought against him.153 When it came to the Court’s step two, an 
examination of the “competing arguments”154 identified the plaintiff’s 
interest as that of not being subjected to the continuous course of 
government action present in the case. But “[o]n the other side of the 
ledger”155 was the government’s interest in being able to act zealously 
without the threat of nebulous lawsuits. “This, then, [was] a case for Bivens 
 
 147. Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)). 
 148. See id. at 574, 585 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg 
quoted the famous Marbury passage about “the very essence of civil liberty” and stated that Bivens 
“drew upon that venerable principle.” Id. at 574. 
 149. E.g., id. at 550 (majority opinion). 
 150. Id. at 554 (emphasis added). See also Tribe, supra note 15, at 70–71. 
 151. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 562. 
 152. Id. (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 389).  
 153. See id. at 551–52. The Court stated that the plaintiff had “an administrative, and ultimately a 
judicial, process for vindicating virtually all of his complaints.” Id. at 553. 
 154. Id. at 554. 
 155. Id. at 555. 
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step two, for weighing reasons for and against the creation of a new cause 
of action, the way common law judges have always done.”156 The majority 
was particularly troubled by the problem of creating “a workable cause of 
action.”157 After all, the government frequently has to drive a hard bargain, 
and those who deal with zealous agents will often complain.158 Granting 
this plaintiff the possibility of a Bivens action could lead to an “enormous 
swath of potential litigation.”159 Justice Ginsburg not only dissented on the 
specifics of the case, but also expressed deep concern about the future of 
Bivens, which she saw as essential to protect “bedrock constitutional 
rights.”160 To the extent that Bivens does play that role, Wilkie is certainly 
part of the narrowing trend that began in the 1980s, building on the original 
exceptions, and tilting strongly toward the prudential-deferential model 
rather than the Marbury-rights model.161 The invocations of a balancing 
methodology suggest a possible third approach. 
Wilkie is certainly not the last word, however. The war on terror is 
already generating a wide range of litigation, some of it based on Bivens.162 
The Supreme Court has already decided one of these cases, although not on 
Bivens grounds.163 Thus, it seems appropriate to take doctrinal stock of 
where Bivens stands today as we enter this potentially decisive era. Will the 
remedy take on a renewed importance, assuming what Justice Ginsburg 
views as its rightful place in American constitutionalism?164 Or will the 
Court continue to deny Bivens remedies, further relegating the doctrine to 
the margins? Can the Court find a middle ground? 
F.  MCCARTHY—AN ANOMALY? 
I have omitted from this chronologically based list of developments 
 
 156. Id. at 554. 
 157. See, e.g., id. at 555. There is a clear resemblance between this consideration and one of the 
political question factors stated in Baker v. Carr: “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 158. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 561–62. 
 159. Id. at 561. 
 160. Id. at 585 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 161. See supra Part II.C. For an excellent critique of Wilkie, see Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 
15 (manuscript at 20–24). They make the point that Wilkie’s facts could place the case within the 
category of retaliation claims—brought under Bivens—that the Court had recognized in other contexts. 
 162. E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.), reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 12, 2008). 
 163. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). The Court decided the case largely on the basis of 
an analysis of pleading requirements, particularly where an immunity defense is asserted. 
 164. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 585 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice 
Ginsburg drew the basic analogy between Bivens and § 1983. She would leave it to Congress “to codify 
and further define the Bivens remedy.” Id. 
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the 1992 decision in McCarthy v. Madigan.165 It is not clear whether 
McCarthy is an anomaly or a revitalization of Bivens that “provided 
optimism that the Court had changed its tune and would extend Bivens in 
the future.”166 McCarthy was a Carlson-like suit by a federal prisoner in 
which the lower courts had denied Bivens relief because the plaintiff had 
failed to exhaust available administrative remedies promulgated by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Supreme Court reversed, largely on the 
basis of established exhaustion principles. Applications of these principles 
led to the conclusion that “petitioner McCarthy need not have exhausted his 
constitutional claim for money damages.”167 The Court then turned to 
Bivens, focusing on special factors. Echoing the conflation cases, the 
McCarthy Court found that the fact that there was no “elaborate and 
comprehensive remedial scheme”168 eliminated one version of the special 
factors exception. The Court, however, also engaged in a balancing inquiry, 
suggesting that this inquiry might be a component of special factors 
analysis.169 As was the case with the general exhaustion analysis, balancing 
led to the conclusion that the plaintiff did not need to exhaust available 
remedies.170 McCarthy is certainly an application of Bivens, and thus a tacit 
reaffirmation of the doctrine. However, it does not seem accurately labeled  
an “extension,” and it is hardly a ringing reaffirmation in the face of cases 
like Schweiker and Bush, which it cites.171 
 
 165. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 803(d), § 7(a), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 (1996). 
 166. Heather J. Hanna & Alan G. Harding, Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium—For the Violation of Every 
Right, There Must Be a Remedy: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Use the Bivens Remedy in Wilkie v. 
Robbins, 8 WYO. L. REV. 193, 210 (2008). The authors added that “[t]his turned out to be a hope 
against hopes.” Id. 
 167. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 149. 
 168. Id. at 152. 
 169. See id. at 152–56. The Court discussed the need to balance the individual’s interest in 
obtaining judicial relief against institutional interests favoring exhaustion. 
 170. See id. at 152 (invoking “an evaluation of the individual and institutional interests at stake in 
this case”). 
 171. The best explanation is that the Court saw the case as posing essentially an exhaustion 
problem given the fact that a Bivens remedy in such a situation was clearly established by Carlson. 
McCarthy is an example of cases where the Court took Bivens as an existing doctrine and focused on 
other issues in a Bivens case. See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (involving a retaliation 
claim); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (applying Fourth Amendment doctrine in a Bivens 
claim). Certainly, immunity doctrine has grown up in the context of Bivens actions as a given. See, e.g., 
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 496–503 (1978). In the exhaustion context, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) 
(2006), as amended in 1996, which imposes exhaustion requirements on Bivens claims based on prison 
conditions, appears to have overruled McCarthy. 
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G.  SOME DOCTRINAL LESSONS: THE PROBLEM OF LACK OF LEGISLATIVE 
AUTHORIZATION, THE § 1983 PARALLEL, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMON LAW 
In the last seven cases specifically posing the question of expanding 
the availability of Bivens relief, the Court has refused to make the remedy 
available.172 “Special factors” have been the major analytical vehicle for 
this shift. Three doctrinal points are in order. The first is that the key to this 
negative approach is the lack of congressional authorization—the issue that 
divided the original Bivens Court. At times, the Court comes close to 
viewing the lack of authorization as itself a special factor counseling 
hesitation.173 Short of this position—which would, in effect, adopt that of 
the original Bivens dissenters—the Court seems to view itself as standing 
on weaker ground than would be the case if Congress had told it to 
proceed. The Court presents itself as reluctant to create a “freestanding” 
constitutional remedy.174 This perception of weaker ground helps to explain 
the prudential-deferential model. The Court lacks the self-assurance about 
proceeding that would follow from adoption of the Marbury-rights model, 
based as it is on that iconic case. 
Two caveats are in order. First, the Court continues to speak of its 
common law role, suggesting broad judicial power and discretion.175 This 
bold language, however, is considerably diminished by the fact that since 
the 1980s this discretion has always been exercised in a negative way. A 
second caveat is that some members of the Court adhere to the original 
Bivens framework and its Marbury-based presumption of the availability of 
relief. But these views are expressed in dissent.176 When one searches for a 
pattern in the totality of cases, the strong conclusion is that the 
contradictory thrusts that were present in Bivens remain, but that the 
resolution is different from in the 1970s. The special factors exception has 
largely swallowed the rule.177 Thus, the war on terror Bivens litigation will 
take place in a generally negative context, precedentially and doctrinally. 
 
 172. Perhaps one should say seven of the last eight, in light of McCarthy. 
 173. In Malesko, the Court cited its earlier statement in Schweiker that “[t]he absence of statutory 
relief for a constitutional violation . . . does not by any means necessarily imply that courts should 
award money damages against the officers responsible for the violation.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 
534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (quoting Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1988)). 
 174. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
 175. See, e.g., id. at 554. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, at 398–411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that judicial discretion 
should be used to imply a remedy). 
 176. See, e.g., Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 574 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 177. See generally Brown, supra note 39. 
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Focusing on the importance of the lack of congressional authorization 
leads to a second important doctrinal point: the uncoupling of Bivens from 
§ 1983. This uncoupling is particularly important in the war on terror 
context because the defendants will almost always be federal, rather than 
state, officials. Bivens is often viewed as what Justice Ginsburg called the 
federal “analog to § 1983.”178 Indeed, a central issue in the original case 
was whether the fact that Congress had created § 1983 for constitutional 
violations by state and local officials precluded the courts from creating a 
similar remedy applicable to federal officials.179 The decision might be seen 
as creating an identical constitutional remedy. The more accurate 
description, however, is that of Justice Stevens: “It is true that we have 
never expressly held that the contours of Bivens and § 1983 are identical. 
The Court, however, has recognized sound jurisprudential reasons for 
parallelism, as different standards for claims against state and federal actors 
‘would be incongruous and confusing.’”180  
In an important forthcoming article, James Pfander and David 
Baltmanis argue for similar treatment of constitutional claims against 
officials at all levels of government.181 They note that both the underlying 
substantive law and the rules of immunity are the same.182 They stress the 
importance of assurance to individuals “that their rights will not vary 
depending on whether the allegedly unconstitutional conduct at issue was 
undertaken by state or federal government actors.”183 In particular, they 
view the Court’s insistence on similar immunity rules in the two contexts 
as resting on the goal of striking a similar “balance between official 
accountability and immunity” in each situation.184 For Pfander and 
Baltmanis, the same balancing should be struck “in the definition of the 
right to sue.”185 
 
 178. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 585 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 179. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 427–28 (Black, J., dissenting). Section 1983 also provides liability 
for statutory violations. 
 180. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Butz 
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 181. See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 15.  
 182. Id. (manuscript at 43–45).  
 183. Id. (manuscript at 44). 
 184.  Id. (manuscript at 45). 
 185. Id. (manuscript at 46). This analysis leads to a presumption of the availability of Bivens and 
the recommendation that “special factors” be abandoned. See id. (manuscript at 28). In addition to these 
strong policy arguments for similarity between the two remedies, Pfander and Baltmanis argue that 
Bivens does enjoy something close to the same congressional foundation as § 1983. They contend that 
Congress’s adoption of rights against the government in amendments to the FTCA and the Westfall Act 
(providing for substitution of the government for individual official defendants in most tort cases) show 
an intent to preserve the Bivens remedy. See id. (manuscript at 32–38). Specifically, Congress intended 
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Despite the force of these arguments, however, the retrenchment and 
subsequent cases make even the notion of “parallelism” seem uncertain. 
Section 1983 is part of a group of Reconstruction statues with a highly 
relevant history. While interpreting it—in the development of “the law of 
section 1983”—the Court has been mindful of the fact that the Fourteenth 
Amendment brought about a revolution in American federalism, placing 
the states in a partially subordinate role.186 Bivens actions present issues not 
of federalism but of separation of powers. The defendants before the 
federal courts are officials of a coequal branch. Congress can alter the 
Bivens action in ways that state legislatures could not alter § 1983. As 
discussed below, Bivens actions might be viewed as presenting political 
questions.187 That doctrine does not apply to federalism issues.188 A Court 
bent on reducing constitutional remedies could certainly find ways of 
cutting back the scope of § 1983, but it could not abolish it. Bivens, on the 
other hand, has no life of its own. 
A third doctrinal point requires discussion: the status of Bivens as 
“constitutional common law.” In a seminal article, Henry Monaghan 
identified “a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules 
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various 
constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to 
amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress.”189 He viewed 
Bivens as an example of this law.190 Monaghan’s thesis has been criticized, 
 
any new remedies against the government to supplement rather than displace Bivens. See id. 
(manuscript at 31). The authors’ argument sheds important new light on the Bivens debate. It is perhaps 
weakened, however, by its lack of direct textual support, see id. (manuscript at 38–39) (noting that the 
language of the Westfall Act does not expressly create a cause of action), and the possibility that any 
ratification of Bivens remedies included judicial power not to grant them, see id. (manuscript at 39). 
Consider the textual issue. It is arguable that if the Constitution is self-executing, § 1983 is 
unnecessary—the Court could have developed state and local analogues to Bivens. Yet the statutory 
basis for actions against state and local defendants for deprivation of federal rights may be seen as 
placing them on a surer footing given the federalism concerns that such suits raise. A judicially created 
cause of action raises separation of powers concerns without the clear statutory foundation of an 
analogue to § 1983. But see id. (manuscript at 38) (discussing congressional “recognition” of Bivens 
actions). 
 186. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453–55 (1976). Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence 
is a classic example of the problems that arise from the states’ uncertain role. A recurring question is 
whether Congress can pass a statute permitting suits against states in federal court. See, e.g., Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 187. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 188. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (stating that the political question 
nonjusticiability doctrine is “primarily a function of the separation of powers”). 
 189. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1975). 
 190. See id. at 23–24. 
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particularly with respect to Bivens.191 However, overt reference and 
recourse to common law processes have long been present in Bivens 
cases.192 Wilkie is the most recent example. Its approach, building on the 
earlier cases, suggests a wide-ranging judicial discretion that permits a 
court to consider any relevant factor—what Justice Harlan in Bivens termed 
“a range of policy considerations . . . at least as broad as the range of those 
a legislature would consider.”193 Moreover, the Court has made it clear that 
Congress can alter Bivens results. 
III.  WAR ON TERROR BIVENS SUITS—A GROWING 
PHENOMENON 
As might be expected, the war on terror has already generated a 
number of Bivens suits.194 Many are moving through the court system; the 
first grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court occurred in June 2008.195 
This section of the Article covers three areas: the types of fact patterns 
likely to be found in the cases, the serious hurdles that a Bivens action 
faces, and the initial manner in which the lower courts are handling the 
cases. There is a lot at stake. These suits put the courts in the position not 
just of judging individual acts, but also of judging the war on terror itself. 
A.  THE TYPES OF SUIT 
Many suits will be generated by the detention and interrogation of 
suspects. Obviously, that activity is at the heart of the government’s 
antiterrorism efforts, whether carried out by law enforcement officials, 
 
 191. See Bandes, supra note 15, at 325. Bandes views the recent Bivens cases as a “rejection” of 
its promise and states that “what the Court has done in the name of separation of powers is to turn away 
from judicial review and to allow the political branches to abuse their power unchecked.” Id. 
 192. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983). 
 193. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 194. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 
2009); Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2nd Cir.), reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 12, 2008); El-Masri v. 
United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Padilla v. Yoo, No. C 08-00035 JSW, 2009 WL 1651273 
(N.D. Cal. June 18, 2009); Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007); Khorrami v. 
Rolince, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (N.D. Ill. 2007); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 
(D.D.C. 2007); Ajaj v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 2d 501 (D.S.C. 2007); Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. 
CV:05-093-S-EJL, 2006 WL 5429570 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2006); Kurzberg v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 
3950(JG), 2006 WL 2738991 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 
(N.D. Cal. 2006); Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. 
Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 195. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (June 16, 2008) (No. 07-1015). The case was decided on 
May 18, 2009. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. 
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intelligence agents, the military, or personnel from other federal agencies. 
Arrests, conditions of detention, allegations of torture, and claims of 
religious and racial discrimination will all arise. A good example are the 
claims set forth in the complaint in Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, a case arising 
out of confinement in a highly restrictive “administrative maximum” 
unit.196 The complaint alleged numerous potential constitutional violations 
including beatings, interference with access to counsel, denial of adequate 
medical care, unreasonable strip and body-cavity searches, harsh 
confinement because of religious beliefs, and harsh confinement because of 
race.197 The plaintiffs based their claims, in part, on the First, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution.198 
Such suits challenging conditions of detention and methods of 
confinement are frequent.199 There are two aspects of these cases that 
deserve additional mention. They frequently include as defendants high-
ranking federal officials on the ground that these officials authorized or 
directed the challenged practices. For example, the defendants in 
Elmaghraby ranged from the Attorney General of the United States to 
“John Doe” corrections officers. The Supreme Court’s first treatment of a 
war on terror Bivens case came in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the successor to 
Elmaghraby.200 One of the questions presented was “[w]hether a cabinet-
level officer or other high-ranking official may be held personally liable for 
the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground 
that, as high-level supervisors, they had constructive notice of the 
discrimination allegedly carried out by such subordinate officials.”201 The 
majority’s resolution of the case cast doubt on theories of supervisory 
liability under Bivens.202 
The notion of high-level liability is taken further in the well-
publicized suit brought by Jose Padilla against former Justice Department 
official John Yoo. The complaint alleged “conscience-shocking 
interrogation techniques and conditions of confinement . . . intended to 
destroy Mr. Padilla’s ordinary emotional and cognitive functioning in order 
 
 196. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). Elmaghraby ultimately became the Iqbal case. 
 197. See id. at *2–*7. 
 198. See id. at *7–*9. 
 199. See Seamon, supra note 7, at 715 (“[T]he victims of . . . torture have begun to sue.”). 
 200. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937. 
 201. Id. at 1956 (Souter, J. dissenting) (quoting the petition for writ of certiorari). 
 202. See id. at 1955 (stating that the majority opinion “does away with supervisory liability under 
Bivens”).  
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to extract from him potentially self-incriminating information.”203 Yoo, 
however, was not a superior officer in the chain of command of those who 
allegedly mistreated Padilla. He was Deputy Assistant Attorney General in 
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. The suit alleges that the 
conduct was the product of several legal memoranda authorizing it, written 
by Yoo.204 
A second important aspect of the detention and interrogation suits is 
that they can put the courts in the position of judging policies such as 
“extraordinary rendition.” This controversial program involves sending 
terrorism suspects to countries that permit harsher interrogation techniques 
than the United States. The best known case is that of Maher Arar, who 
brought a Bivens suit seeking damages for extraordinary rendition, which 
put the courts in the middle of one of the most hotly debated issues of the 
entire war on terror.205 
Bivens suits can arise in other contexts as well. For example, various 
forms of surveillance are likely to be a fruitful source of litigation. In a 
widely publicized suit in which the American Civil Liberties Union was the 
lead plaintiff, a federal district court enjoined the National Security 
Agency’s Terrorist Surveillance Program.206 The Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit reversed and dismissed the case on standing grounds.207 A 
different form of surveillance claim was presented in Tabbaa v. Chertoff, in 
which plaintiffs challenged a border search that occurred after they 
returned from an Islamic conference in Canada.208 Although the Fourth 
 
 203. Complaint ¶ 21, Padilla v. Yoo, 2009 WL 1651273 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2009) (No. C 08-
00035 JSW). See also John Schwartz, Judge Weighs Dismissing Case Involving Torture Memorandums, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A13 (discussing the Padilla lawsuit). 
 204. Complaint, supra note 203, ¶¶ 16, 20. These memoranda have become quite controversial, 
particularly the joint Bybee-Yoo Memorandum, referred to as the “Torture Memorandum.” See WAYNE 
MCCORMACK, LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 551–55 (2d ed. 2008). Yoo has criticized the suit in 
the following terms: “The lawsuit by Padilla and his Yale Law School lawyers is an effort to open 
another front against U.S. anti-terrorism policies. If he succeeds, it won’t be long before opponents of 
the war on terror use the courtroom to reverse the wartime measures needed to defeat those responsible 
for killing 3,000 Americans on 9/11.” John Yoo, Terrorist Tort Travesty, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2008, at 
A13. 
 205. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir.), reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 12, 2008). For a 
critical discussion of the Arar incident, see Jules Lobel, The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad 
Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1407, 1429–32 (2007). See generally Rendition to Torture: The Case 
of Maher Arar: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, 
and Oversight and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. 
on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (considering the practice of 
extraordinary rendition). 
 206. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev’d, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 207. ACLU, 493 F.3d 644. 
 208. Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 93–96 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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Amendment played a prominent role in the plaintiffs’ claims in both cases, 
neither suit requested damages.209 These are, however, the kinds of 
government activities which can lead to a Bivens action.210 
Bivens is indeed at the center of counter-counter-terrorism litigation. 
The underlying policies of the war on terror and the zeal of those who 
prosecute it inevitably lead to potential violations of constitutional rights. 
Those who oppose the war on terror, as well as those who view their rights 
as having been infringed (and their lawyers), have seized on Bivens as a 
key to fighting back. Peter Margulies describes damages suits against 
federal officers as part of a range of initiatives that drive campaigns of what 
he calls “crossover advocacy.”211 David Zaring has stated that “in these 
high-profile cases, winning the lawsuit is less precisely the point than is 
practicing increasingly personal politics while calling attention to a policy 
and a plight,”212 and that “[t]hese suits are more symbolic than likely to 
succeed, in that they rely not on the verdict, but on the ability to make a 
claim against a policy-maker.”213 As Zaring admits, some, perhaps many, 
of the plaintiffs will have suffered real injuries of the sort at which Bivens 
was aimed.214 The distinction is not easy to draw and may lead to 
downgrading the importance of serious lawsuits that are not publicity 
stunts.215 There is still, as noted, a lot at stake. Bivens suits could derail the 
war on terror, or at least seriously impede it. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the government and individual officials have available a range of 
defenses to stop the suits short of the merits. 
B.  DEFENSES—OTHER THAN SPECIAL FACTORS 
In this section, I will examine briefly two possible defenses to a war 
on terror Bivens action, other than the special factors exception. Before 
considering that defense, it is important to realize that it is by no means the 
only one available. If one has reservations about these suits and is tempted 
to regard the special factors analysis as an important threshold limit, it may 
be relevant that there are other potential avenues of limiting them. It may 
 
 209. See id. at 92; ACLU, 493 F.3d at 650–51. 
 210. See In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (refusing to dismiss a Bivens action 
alleging surveillance in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 211.  See Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy 
Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2009).  
 212. Zaring, supra note 22, at 332. 
 213. Id. at 335.  
 214. See id. at 340.  
 215. It must be noted, however, that Padilla sought only one dollar in damages against Yoo. 
Complaint, supra note 203, ¶ 109b. 
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not be necessary to push the prudential-deferential model to the point that 
Bivens really does lose all force in war on terror contexts. 
The two most prominent defenses are the state secrets privilege216 and 
the qualified immunity defense. Both defenses can be viewed as protecting 
the effectiveness of government programs, whether by shielding an official 
from the burdens of litigation or by keeping secret information regarding 
that program. In El-Masri v. United States, the Fourth Circuit stated the 
essence of the privilege as follows: “Under the state secrets doctrine, the 
United States may prevent disclosure of information in a judicial 
proceeding if ‘there is a reasonable danger’ that such disclosure ‘will 
expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should 
not be divulged.’”217 
If the privilege is successfully invoked, it is sometimes possible for 
the litigation to continue, but if an attempt to proceed would threaten 
disclosure of protected matters, the suit must be dismissed.218 In El-Masri, 
the court dismissed on state secrets grounds the plaintiff’s Bivens challenge 
to his extraordinary rendition, even though the general existence of the 
program was a matter of public knowledge.219 State secrets dismissals are a 
real risk for plaintiffs in war on terror suits, including Bivens actions.220 At 
the moment, the privilege is under serious attack, with critics suggesting 
various ways of limiting it, including giving Congress a role in pending 
litigation.221 
The immunity defense is well known, both in suits brought under 
§ 1983 and those involving federal officials.222 Most Bivens defendants can 
 
 216. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007) (surveying state secrets decisions and considering alternatives); 
Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1931 
(2007) (considering how receptive the judiciary should be to the executive’s claim of the state secrets 
privilege in light of the separation of powers). 
 217. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)). 
 218. See id. at 306. 
 219. See id. at 308–11. 
 220. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding 
that the plaintiff in a Bivens suit could not establish standing because the sealed document necessary to 
demonstrate its standing was covered by the state secrets privilege). Further proceedings on remand in 
this complicated litigation are reported at In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records 
Litigation, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 221. See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 216, at 1312. 
 222. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (establishing qualified immunity as the 
standard of immunity generally available to federal officers). See also United States v. Stanley, 483 
U.S. 669, 690–706 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority’s special factors inquiry 
had supplanted the standard immunity inquiry). 
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claim qualified immunity. The federal courts’ approach has been to first 
determine whether the defendant violated a constitutional right. If so, the 
court considers whether the right was clearly established at the time of the 
alleged violation and “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that 
his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”223 The Supreme 
Court recently revisited the issue of the test for qualified immunity.224 It is 
not clear what effect its decision might have on war on terror Bivens 
actions. Many of these cases will involve rights that were clearly 
established at the time of the government action and will survive 
preliminary motions to dismiss on immunity grounds.225 On the other hand, 
some rights may not have been apparent to a reasonable official. The 
immunity defense will prevent some suits from being brought. In Iqbal, 
however, the Second Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that the 
post–September 11 context created extraordinary circumstances that could 
alter a right’s status as clearly established.226 The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Iqbal did not decide this issue but did express the view that those 
circumstances were relevant to the state of mind of officials accused of 
discrimination when they were dealing with suspected terrorists.227 
Thus, the narrow approach to Bivens does not stand alone. Other 
doctrines are available to keep counter-counter-terrorism litigation in 
check. Furthermore, there is an analytical kinship between the special 
factors exception, the immunity defense, and the state secrets privilege. 
Immunity protects the official from the burden of litigation and also 
furthers the government’s interest in having zealous officials. The state 
secrets privilege operates to shield government programs from judicial 
oversight generated by lawsuits. Immunity, if upheld, stops litigation at an 
early stage. Successful invocation of the privilege can sometimes halt 
litigation as well. The prudential-deferential model furthers similar interests 
and leads to dismissal before the merits. Does the application of this 
approach to Bivens suits in a “strong” manner amount to overkill? One’s 
answer probably depends on how one views counter-counter-terrorism suits 
in the first place. Their compensation function can be accomplished by 
other means. The core issue is the desirable extent of judicial oversight of 
 
 223. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 
(2009). 
 224. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808. 
 225. John Yoo himself has questioned whether immunity doctrine will be of much help to Bivens 
defendants. See Yoo, supra note 204. 
 226. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 227. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–52. 
BROW8 10/19/2009 8:57 PM 
2009] COUNTER-COUNTER-TERRORISM 877 
 
executive actions in the war on terror. In its present form, Bivens points 
toward a very narrow role. 
C.  THE WAR ON TERROR AS A SPECIAL FACTOR 
In this section, I consider several lower court opinions on special 
factors analysis as a prelude to a general treatment of the issue in Part IV. 
The most in-depth discussions are found in the district court and court of 
appeals opinions in Arar v. Ashcroft.228 The plaintiff, a dual citizen of Syria 
and Canada, was initially detained by federal agents at John F. Kennedy 
Airport in New York. After approximately two weeks he was “rendered” to 
Syria, where he was confined for ten months.229 He alleged coercive and 
involuntary interrogation in New York, and torture and other cruelty in 
Syria. His action against a range of federal officials was based in part on 
Bivens, claiming deprivation of due process rights. The district court 
expressed uncertainty as to “whether substantive due process would erect a 
per se bar to coercive investigations, including torture, for the purpose of 
preventing a terrorist attack.”230 For purposes of the Bivens inquiry, 
however, it assumed an affirmative answer.231 The court also concluded 
that cases such as Rasul v. Bush,232 and the fact that the conduct either 
occurred or was initiated on U.S. soil, might vest Arar with “some 
substantive protection”233 despite arguments for dismissing on foreign 
territory or nationality grounds. This led it to the special factors exception 
to Bivens. The opinion is a classic example of the prudential-deferential 
model. 
The district court treated the special factors analysis as a separation of 
powers issue: “the question of who should decide whether . . . a remedy 
should be provided.”234 In terms that evoke the political question 
doctrine,235 it repeated its view that “the foreign policy and national-
security concerns raised here are properly left to the political branches of 
 
 228. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), 
reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 12, 2008). Although the en banc decision may change the result, the 
district court and court of appeals panel decisions present a full discussion of the issues on both sides. 
 229. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. at 252–57. There is extensive literature on extraordinary rendition. 
See, e.g., WITTES, supra note 22, at 25–28. 
 230. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
 231. See id. at 275. 
 232. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that federal courts’ statutory jurisdiction to hear 
habeas cases extends to Guantanamo Bay). 
 233. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 279. 
 234. Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983)). 
 235. The court treated the Bivens and political question doctrines as separate. See id. at 283 n.14. 
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government.”236 It raised the possibility of embarrassment of the 
government through “multifarious pronouncements” by different 
branches.237 It stressed that judicial involvement might present a lack of 
expertise problem and called for “explicit legislation.”238 Thus, the court 
dismissed the counts based on extraordinary rendition.239 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court by a 2-1 margin.240 The split is a classic example of the 
difference between the two models discussed here. The majority utilized 
the prudential-deferential model. It expressed reluctance to “probe deeply 
into the inner workings of the national security apparatus of at least three 
foreign countries, as well as that of the United States.”241 The majority 
went so far as to state that the government’s invocation of the state secrets 
privilege was itself a special factor counseling hesitation.242 It also 
expressed concern about diminishing the federal government’s ability “to 
speak with one voice” to foreign governments243 and concluded that 
Congress should be the branch to decide “the availability of a damages 
remedy in circumstances where the adjudication of the claim at issue would 
necessarily intrude on the implementation of national security policies and 
interfere with our country’s relations with foreign powers.”244 Thus, the 
prudential-deferential model showed the broad reach of its logic. The court 
deferred to Congress with respect to the remedial decision because 
adjudication could have harmful effects within a particular context: the war 
on terror. 
The dissenting opinion by Judge Sack is an equally classic example of 
the Marbury-rights model. It emphasized that “there is a long history of 
 
 236. Id. at 280. The court also noted the argument that government policy toward aliens is closely 
related to other fields, such as foreign affairs and exercise of the war power. See id. at 282. 
 237. Id. at 282. 
 238. Id. at 283. The court stated that “the task of balancing individual rights against national-
security concerns is one that courts should not undertake without the guidance or the authority of the 
coordinate branches, in whom the Constitution imposes responsibility for our foreign affairs and 
national security.” Id. 
 239. See id. at 283–85. The court permitted the plaintiff to amend his complaint concerning the 
detention and interrogation within the United States. See id. 
 240. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’g 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, reh’g en banc 
granted (Aug. 12, 2008). 
 241. Id. at 181. 
 242. See id. at 183. 
 243. Id. at 182. 
 244. Id. at 181. Seamon cites the district court opinion in Arar as support for the following 
proposition: “The Court might be particularly reluctant to recognize a Bivens claim when doing so 
would require judicial review of the executive branch’s conduct of foreign affairs and military strategy, 
as may be true of torture claims arising from the war on terrorism.” Seamon, supra note 7, at 778. 
BROW8 10/19/2009 8:57 PM 
2009] COUNTER-COUNTER-TERRORISM 879 
 
judicial review of Executive and Legislative decisions related to the 
conduct of foreign relations and national security.”245 In support of this 
proposition, Judge Sack drew on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld.246 The Second Circuit has heard Arar en banc. One can 
anticipate a split decision, as well as a substantial likelihood of Supreme 
Court review.247 
The same arguments appear in other cases. One circuit court judge 
initially found special factors in a detention case. Judge Brown of the 
District of Columbia Circuit described “the method of detaining and 
interrogating alleged enemy combatants during a war [as] a matter with 
grave national security implications.”248 After remand from the Supreme 
Court on other grounds, a panel of the circuit court adopted Judge Brown’s 
special factors position as an alternative holding.249 One district court has 
found that the Federal Privacy Act provides a comprehensive remedy that 
constitutes a special factor counseling hesitation.250 Naturally, the 
government officials argue special factors vigorously in defending Bivens 
cases.251 
Not all courts have been as receptive to the special factors defense, as 
illustrated by the district court opinion in Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft.252 As 
discussed previously, this case raised a wide range of issues based on 
 
 245. Arar, 532 F.3d.at 213 (Sack, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The dissent also 
discussed the question of when it is proper to treat a Bivens complaint as seeking to extend that remedy 
to a new context. Id. at 208. 
 246. See id. at 213 (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive 
in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.” (quoting Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004))). 
 247. The NEW YORK TIMES has urged reversal. See Tortured Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2008, at 
A28. 
 248. Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 673 (D.C. Cir.) (Brown, J., concurring), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 
763 (2008) (mem.). See also In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(finding “special factors” and refusing to allow a Bivens right of action). 
 249. See Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  
 250. Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 117 (D.D.C. 2005). The government recently settled 
Hatfill’s case. See Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Scientist Is Paid Millions by U.S. in Anthrax Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 2008, at A1. 
 251. See, e.g., Defendant John Yoo’s Motion to Dismiss at 12–24, Padilla v. Yoo, 2009 WL 
1651273 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2009) (No. C 08-00035 JSW). 
 252. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). Also, in Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2008), the 
district court noted the defense but did not reach it. Robert Chesney states that it is “worth noting that 
the opinion rejects out of hand the government’s suggestion that a Bivens remedy would be 
inappropriate.” Posting of Robert Chesney to nationalsecuritylaw@lists.wfu.edu (Sept. 30, 2008) (on 
file with author). 
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detention and interrogation of a terrorist suspect shortly after September 11, 
2001. The government argued that the extraordinary context of the 
September 11 attacks constituted a special factor. The court recognized the 
“unique and complex law enforcement and security challenges” posed by 
terrorism threats, but it insisted that constitutional protections must remain 
in effect.253 Like Judge Sack in Arar, it drew on Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in which she emphasized the particular 
importance of the judiciary’s Marbury-based, rights-protective role during 
the war on terror.254 
A similar rejection of special factors arguments can be found in the 
district court decision largely denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss in 
Padilla v. Yoo.255 Jose Padilla, an American citizen, brought a Bivens 
action against former Justice Department official John Yoo, claiming in 
part that Yoo’s legal advice had laid the groundwork for unconstitutional 
interrogation tactics used against Padilla after his designation as an enemy 
combatant.256 In moving to dismiss the complaint, Yoo relied heavily on 
the special factors defense. The court first rejected any notion of special 
factors based on an alternative remedy.257 It distinguished many of the 
Supreme Court cases discussed above on the ground that the “special 
factors” in those cases were the alternative remedies available.258 The court 
then turned to the possibility of context-based special factors, considering 
such potential issues as military considerations, national security, and 
foreign relations concerns.259 
The court rejected all of these possible grounds for a special factors 
dismissal. In doing so, it engaged in a highly fact-specific analysis. For 
example, any military concerns disappeared because Padilla’s “detention 
was not a necessary removal from the battlefield.”260 As for foreign affairs 
considerations, the court distinguished Arar on the ground that it involved a 
foreign national and interactions with foreign governments.261 It noted 
 
 253. See Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *14. 
 254. See id. (“[I]t is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s 
commitment to due process is most severely tested.” (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 
(2004))). 
 255. Padilla, 2009 WL 1651273. 
 256. See id. at *2–*7. 
 257. See id. at *10 (finding that other than a Bivens suit, “Padilla has no other means of redress for 
the alleged injuries he sustained as a result of his detention and interrogation”). 
 258. See id. at *12–*14 (distinguishing Bush and Schweiker). 
 259. See id. at *15–*19. 
 260. Id. at *17.  
 261. See id. at *18–*19. “The treatment of an American citizen on American soil does not raise 
the same specter of issues relating to foreign relations.” Id. at *19. 
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courts’ concerns about “intrusion” into these areas262 but saw no general 
problem with intrusion into the conduct of the war or terror, at least where 
a citizen’s individual liberties were at stake.263 
IV.  SPECIAL FACTORS AND THE WAR ON TERROR BIVENS 
ACTIONS—A PROPOSED ANALYSIS 
A.  THE PRUDENTIAL-DEFERENTIAL MODEL AND WAR ON TERROR   
BIVENS ACTIONS 
1.  The General Problem of Shared Competence 
The Supreme Court’s Bivens precedents do not deal with this new 
context. The lower court cases are helpful but not dispositive. One way to 
look at the issue is to view Bivens as having changed substantially over 
four decades. The Court has moved from a presumption in favor of a 
constitutional damages remedy (with two specific exceptions) to a 
presumption against. Bivens has even been portrayed by a lower court as 
“disfavored.”264 At the time, this portrayal by the district court might have 
seemed an overstatement. In Iqbal, however, the Supreme Court itself 
offered the following assement on the state of Bivens: “Because implied 
causes of action are disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend 
Bivens liability ‘to any new context or new category of defendants.’”265 
Perhaps the most accurate assessment is the Wilkie v. Robbins Court’s 
statement that the remedy “is not an automatic entitlement.”266 Why is it so 
hard to make an accurate assessment of Bivens? The answer is not that the 
Court has completely reversed its position on the whole subject of 
constitutional remedies.267 The Court made it clear from the beginning that 
Congress has the upper hand in deciding whether to provide such remedies. 
This is apparent in the second exception, which refers explicitly to a 
 
 262. See id. at *16, *19. 
 263. See id. at *17, *19. 
 264. In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 265. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 
U.S. 61, 68 (2001)). Cf. Neb. Beef, Ltd. v. Greening, 398 F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing a 
“presumption against judicial recognition of direct actions for violations of the Constitution by federal 
officials or employees”). 
 266. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
 267. But see Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Bivens is a relic of the heady days 
in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them to be 
‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition.”). 
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congressionally created alternative.268 Equally important is Bivens’s 
citation in the context of the first exception (special factors) of United 
States v. Standard Oil and United States v. Gilman.269 Those 
nonconstitutional cases emphasized not only Congress’s expertise in 
matters of fiscal policy, but also its role in devising remedies to carry out 
that policy. “[E]xercise of judicial power to establish the new 
liability . . . would be intruding within a field properly within Congress’s 
control and as to a matter concerning which it has seen fit to take no 
action.”270 
In stating the first exception, the Court referred to “special factors 
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”271 
This language points out the ever-present potential of Congress bringing to 
bear its expertise—both its substantive expertise with respect to a given 
subject matter and its expertise on how to remedy constitutional violations 
in the context of that subject matter. The courts do not lose their own 
expertise, but we are more in the land of constitutional common law than of 
Marbury-compelled remedies.272 Thus, the post-1980s shift can be viewed 
as the result of a growing awareness of the separation of powers dimension 
of the problem of constitutional torts by federal officials, an issue not 
present in the context of § 1983. 
A further illustration of the general problem of shared competence is 
the fact that the 1980s cases from Chappell to Schweiker often conflated 
the exceptions.273 As noted earlier, they lumped under the heading of 
special factors both the subject matter and the remedies that Congress had 
provided to deal with it. Bush v. Lucas went so far as to say, in the context 
of a constitutional claim, that “the ultimate question on the merits in this 
case may appropriately be characterized as one of ‘federal personnel 
policy.’”274 Yet the Court also discussed extensively the range of 
congressionally provided remedies available to the plaintiff.275 
 
 268. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971). 
 269. Id. at 396 (citing United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301 (1947); United States v. 
Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954)). 
 270. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 316. 
 271. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added). 
 272. Justice Brennan may have had in mind a relatively narrow role for the first exception, but he 
let the doctrinal genie out of the bottle. 
 273. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 15, at 297. 
 274. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1983). 
 275. See id. at 385–88. Indeed, congressional inaction in the face of existing remedies might 
become dispositive. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (suggesting “judicial 
deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent”). 
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It is undeniable that the Bivens doctrine seems to have undergone a 
shift in the 1980s cases toward the prudential-deferential approach, but the 
ingredients of that approach were always present in the doctrine, 
particularly in the Court’s emphasis on who is to decide,276 with the 
ultimate answer being Congress. Moreover, the element of judicial 
policymaking and discretion seems at least as open as it was in Justice 
Harlan’s Bivens concurrence.277 The question is whether that discretion 
invariably tilts toward a negative outcome and, if so, why. One answer 
might be the reliance of Bivens on statutory implied rights of action, an 
area in which the Court has apparently cut back.278 However, the Court had 
begun to uncouple the two as early as Davis v. Passman.279 It is also clear 
that focus on the subject matter diverts focus from the rights asserter and 
the rights asserted. Thus, the prudential-deferential approach points toward 
a negation of judicial power, while the Marbury-rights approach points the 
other way. The order in which the cases arose may also have played a role 
in the shift. The first three Bivens cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—
presented the Court with relatively isolated examples of misuse of power. 
Later cases such as Bush and Stanley represented more of an attack on the 
structure of programs or on underlying governmental policies. Reluctance 
to engage in this inquiry led to the gradual ascendency of the prudential-
deferential model during what turned out to be the formative period of 
Bivens. If this approach remains prevalent, the war on terror cases may well 
continue the judicial refusal to “extend” Bivens to new contexts. 
2.  The War on Terror as a Special Factor Counseling Hesitation 
a.  Policy 
The war on terror presents several obvious candidates for special 
factors analysis. Every such case will involve national security, an area in 
which the Court has expressed hesitation to involve the judiciary.280 In a 
recent Bivens case finding special factors present, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia stated that “[i]t is established beyond peradventure 
that military affairs, foreign relations, and national security are 
 
 276. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 380. 
 277. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402–11 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 278. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 n.3 (2001) (noting a retreat “from our 
previous willingness to imply a cause of action where Congress has not provided one”); id. at 75 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the significance of the cutback on implied statutory rights of action). 
 279. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240–42 (1979). 
 280. See Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). 
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constitutionally committed to the political branches of our government.”281 
The quote emphasizes that the prudential approach is not just a matter of 
judicial reluctance to intervene in certain areas. It is based on a preference 
for the political branches as the locus of decisionmaking in matters of 
national security.282 
The reference to “military affairs” brings up a second point: courts are 
unwilling to oversee the conduct of wartime operations.283 Courts are 
concerned not only about the Constitution’s commitment of the “war 
power” to the political branches as shown by numerous provisions.284 They 
are also concerned with the practical effects of direct interference such as 
disrupting operations by deposing combatants and otherwise involving 
them in a trial.285 Of course, the elasticity of the concept of a war on 
terror286 may counsel hesitation in finding special factors counseling 
hesitation.287 Interrogations within the United States are considerably 
removed from the foreign military operations that generated the original 
hands-off approach. 
A third reason for finding special factors present in the war on terror 
context is the possibility of a significant foreign affairs dimension. Courts 
often emphasize the importance of deference to the political branches in the 
foreign affairs context.288 Like national security, one might argue that any 
war on terror case involves foreign affairs. The United States is working 
with many countries to deal with the global problem of terrorism. If a court 
inquires into the facts of a specific case, it is likely to find foreign affairs 
lurking below, if not close to, the surface. In Arar, for example, the 
rendition of a Canadian-Syrian citizen involved relations with both 
countries. The district court noted that the Canadian officials could be 
 
 281. In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 107 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 282. Recall Bush’s emphasis on the question of who should decide. 
 283. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (“[W]e accord the greatest respect 
and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of 
a war.”). 
 284. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (power to declare war); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 
(power to raise and support armies); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (power to provide and maintain a 
navy); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States . . . .”). 
 285. See In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 105. 
 286. See The Terrorists Who Didn’t Bark, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2008, at A14. See also Hamdi, 
542 U.S. at 521 (recognizing that the war on terror may require rethinking traditional assumptions about 
war). 
 287. There is a risk that law enforcement officials will attempt to shield misconduct during 
criminal investigations by invoking the war on terror. For example, crimes such as credit card fraud by 
illegal aliens might be presented as related to terror, thus justifying more intrusive investigative tactics. 
 288. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). 
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embarrassed if, despite their denials, the suit showed they were working 
with American authorities.289 An Arab country such as Syria might also be 
embarrassed, for different reasons, by revelation of cooperation with the 
United States.290 The court concluded generally that “this case raises 
crucial national-security and foreign policy considerations, implicating ‘the 
complicated multilateral negotiations concerning efforts to halt 
international terrorism.’”291 In sum, the national security, military, foreign 
affairs triad of traditional reasons for judicial hesitation argue strongly for 
such hesitation here.292 This view also rests on a rejection of the “law 
enforcement” model of terrorism as the only valid means of analysis. The 
intelligence and military models are equally relevant.293 Obviously, the 
concepts overlap. Perhaps terrorism and efforts to combat it should be 
regarded as sui generis. 
Bivens actions raise an additional question: Should those who are 
defending the country be subject to damages suits when they make 
mistakes, even of constitutional magnitude? They may be carrying out 
official policy. Immunity doctrines may not shield them. There is, of 
course, the possibility that because of indemnification and representation 
practices the supposedly individual defendant is really the government. The 
Court’s doctrine has proceeded on the opposite assumption, emphasizing 
deterrence of individual, rogue behavior.294 There is at least a theoretical 
risk that Bivens actions will deter the guardians from doing their jobs. 
Detainee advocate Peter Margulies has argued against “sweeping civil and 
criminal liability for Bush administration officials” on the ground that 
“such measures could chill future officials confronting crises.”295 If the war 
on terror is a context in which zealous pursuit of the objective is desirable, 
and one views the Bivens action as a fiction in which the government is 
already the real defendant,296 the essential question may be whether such 
suits should be available to challenge policy apart from any individual 
 
 289. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d 
Cir.), reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 12, 2008). 
 290. See id. 
 291. Id. (citing Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 292. The close relationship between the policies underlying the special factors exception and the 
political question doctrine is clearly visible. 
 293. See, e.g., GUIORA, supra note 25, at 27–28 (discussing three models for shaping 
counterterrorism policy).  
 294. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69–71 (2001). 
 295. Peter Margulies, Peter Margulies Responds, 30 A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP., Nov./Dec. 
2008, at 7, 7. 
 296. See generally Pillard, supra note 22 (contending that the real defendant in interest in Bivens 
actions is the government). 
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effects. When the individual defendants include the policymakers 
themselves, the two functions of the Bivens action merge. 
Should courts utilize the prudential-deferential model to block 
counter-counter-terrorism via litigation? I do not dispute the importance of 
individual compensation. However, compensation can be provided through 
entity liability.297 I advocate a strong use of the model, despite the fact that 
it sacrifices judicial review of controversial executive action. This approach 
will not please those who favor a strong judicial role in the war on terror 
context; however, policymaking via tort suits seems singularly 
inappropriate in this sensitive area of national security. Congressional 
oversight of possible executive misconduct is preferable, and has taken 
place,298 especially since a Democratic Congress is in the position of 
investigating a Republican administration. Indeed, the national political 
dialogue is extensively focused on proposals to engage in broad inquiries 
into the antiterror efforts of the Bush Administration.299 Still, when 
Congress and the executive are in accord on how to wage the “war,” that 
fact may make the issue look more like a political question than the subject 
matter of a lawsuit in which officials happen to be the defendants. The 
existence of a national effort against terrorism may well be a special factor 
counseling hesitation, and the prudential-deferential model forces courts to 
focus on the effects of their actions on that effort. 
b.  Precedents 
To what extent do the Court’s Bivens precedents shed light on the 
question of whether the war on terror will be treated as a special factor 
counseling hesitation given the fact that none of them deals with the matter 
directly? On a general level, they can be seen as demonstrating a move 
away from the Marbury-rights model and toward special factors analysis 
and the prudential-deferential model. This suggests that that model is likely 
to prevail in counter-counter-terrorism litigation. However, the key 
question concerns the Court’s refusal to extend Bivens to new “contexts”: 
What characteristics of those new contexts made them special factors? To a 
considerable extent, it was the subject matter, such as military affairs, in 
which the Court saw Congress as possessing special expertise.300 Statutory 
 
 297. See infra text accompanying notes 413–34 (discussing alternative schemes for providing 
compensation from the government). 
 298. See, e.g., Joint Hearing, supra note 205; Restoring the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2005); Mark Mazzetti, 
Senate Panel to Pursue Investigation of C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A14. 
 299. See, e.g., Mazzetti, supra note 298. 
 300. See Tribe, supra note 15, at 66. 
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developments were also relevant. For example, the existence of some 
remedy played a role,301 although congressional action in the general field 
may have been enough.302 
Congress has enacted a broad array of statues to deal with terrorism, 
both before and after September 11, 2001. The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) was passed in 1978.303 Obviously, September 
11 produced a number of statutory responses.304 This extensive framework 
includes attention to remedial issues. For example, Congress has provided a 
civil action under FISA for improper electronic intercepts.305 One district 
court has suggested that the fact that Congress has addressed “detainee 
treatment without creating a private cause of action for detainees injured by 
military officials”306 is relevant to the denial of a Bivens action. One could 
argue that counter-counter-terrorism suits trigger the second Bivens 
exception, but the important point of the conflation phenomenon is that the 
two exceptions are read together, grouped under the special factors 
counseling hesitation rubric. 
Thus, it becomes important to consider how to define the field that the 
Court found unsuitable for judicial intervention. In Bush, it was federal 
employment policy.307 In Chappell and Stanley, it was the internal 
 
 301. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1983) (emphasizing a comprehensive 
statutory system of military justice which “provides for the review and remedy of complaints and 
grievances such as those presented by respondents”). It does not appear that Stanley had a nonjudicial 
remedy, at least not an arguably adequate one. 
 302. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987). The emphasis on the fact that 
Congress has acted in the field raises the question of how much, if at all, Congress must have addressed 
remedial issues. 
 303.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 101, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006). 
 304. E.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739; Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). See generally MCCORMACK, supra note 204, at 
237–39 (discussing the USA PATRIOT Act). 
 305. See 50 U.S.C. § 1810. On the other hand, in dealing with torture, Congress has stated that 
nothing in the statute shall be “construed as creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by 
law by any party in any civil proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340B (2006). Coupled with the statutes 
discussed in the next footnote, it is certainly possible to argue that Congress has focused on the 
particular remedial issues raised by the war on terror. 
 306. In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 107 n.23 (D.D.C. 2007). Both the 
Military Commissions Act and the Detainee Treatment Act contain language which appears to forbid 
actions by certain detainees “relating to any aspect of the detention.” See, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act, 
sec. 1005(e)(1), § 2241(e)(2), 119 Stat. at 2742; Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 
2007), rev’d on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (“[The Military Commissions Act] eliminates 
jurisdiction over non-habeas claims by aliens detained as enemy combatants.”). 
 307. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 381–88 (1983) (discussing the development of civil service 
remedies). The Court noted “the comprehensive nature of the remedies currently available.” Id. at 388. 
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operations of the military.308 Stanley comes the closest, with its caution 
against “judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military 
matters.”309 It is clear, however, that the Court was referring to the internal 
operations of the military, not to military activity generally, although this 
subject is addressed in other decisions.310 The cases involve more discrete 
and contained subjects than the war on terror. Yet as long as one views one 
dimension of the prudential approach as Congress’s possession of a special 
competence over a range of areas, it is perhaps not a stretch to treat the war 
on terror as a single, albeit multifaceted, subject and to say that Congress 
has a special competence (and constitutional charge, along with the 
executive) to deal with its component parts, including remedial issues. This 
argument is a point for treating the war on terror as a special factor 
counseling hesitation in fashioning a Bivens remedy. Still, it is the 
executive branch, more than Congress, that has taken a forceful role in 
policymaking, often relying on theories of inherent executive power. Thus, 
extensive use of the special factors analysis (the prudential-deferential 
model) is open to the criticism that deference to Congress has subtly 
morphed into deference to the executive. 
Lower court cases are of some help in understanding the special 
factors problem, but the current cases contain judicial views on both sides 
of the issue.311 There is also some relevant pre–September 11 precedent. 
The most frequently cited case is Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, a District of 
Columbia decision authored by then-Judge Scalia.312 Reagan was, in part, a 
Bivens action against high-level federal officials based on their support of 
the Nicaraguan “Contras.”313 The court, writing after Bush and Chappell, 
viewed the case as a classic special factors problem. The large number of 
competing policy considerations called for a legislative solution of the 
remedial issue. Scalia wrote, “We have no doubt that these considerations 
of institutional competence preclude judicial creation of damage remedies 
here.”314 He also extrapolated “the special needs of foreign affairs” from 
Chappell’s concern for the special needs of the armed forces.315 
 
 308. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (noting the special relationship 
between soldiers and superior officers). 
 309. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682 (1987). 
 310. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1981) (dealing with the refusal to register 
females under the Military Selective Services Act and recognizing the professional military judgment 
involved in “decisions as to the composition, equipping, training, and control of a military force”). 
 311. See supra Part III.C. 
 312. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 313. See id. at 205–06 (discussing allegations that U.S. support led to harm of innocent civilians). 
 314. Id. at 208. 
 315. See id. at 208–09. 
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I will quote at length from the opinion, in part because it could be a 
precursor of things to come: 
The foreign affairs implications of suits such as this cannot be ignored—
their ability to produce what the Supreme Court has called in another 
context “embarrassment of our government abroad” through 
“multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” 
Whether or not the present litigation is motivated by considerations of 
geopolitics rather than personal harm, we think that as a general matter 
the danger of foreign citizens’ using the courts in situations such as this 
to obstruct the foreign policy of our government is sufficiently acute that 
we must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy 
should exist.316 
One can find other lower court opinions citing national security in the 
special factors analysis.317 A recurring theme is that of deference to the 
political branches, not just on the specific question of remedy.318 The 
echoes of the political question doctrine are obvious. That is my second 
reason for quoting Judge Scalia at length; he makes specific the link 
between special factors and political questions with his citation to Baker v. 
Carr.319 
3.  The War on Terror as a Political Question—Reinforcing the Special 
Factors Conclusion 
As discussed earlier,320 considerations similar to those underlying the 
political question doctrine played a role in the development of the 
prudential-deferential version of Bivens. Not surprisingly, the analytical 
similarities of the two approaches have surfaced in lower court war on 
terror Bivens cases, despite the expressed view that the two doctrines are 
different.321 Issues of national security, foreign affairs, and military 
 
 316. Id. at 209 (citation omitted). 
 317. See, e.g., Beattie v. Boeing Co., 43 F.3d 559, 564–67 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that the 
national security implications of security clearance decisions constituted a special factor); Wilson v. 
Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74, 93–96 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that the national security implications of the 
disclosure of CIA status constituted a special factor). 
 318. See, e.g., Beattie, 43 F.3d at 565 (noting the judiciary’s lack of expertise and that security 
clearance decisions are entrusted to executive discretion); Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 93–94 (noting the 
need for executive discretion). 
 319. Reagan, 770 F.2d at 209 (referring to “multifarious pronouncements by various departments 
on one question”). 
 320. See supra text accompanying notes 116–19. 
 321. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 283 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 
157 (2d Cir.), reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 12, 2008). At the end of its special factors analysis, the 
district court stated, “Having determined that no Bivens remedy is available here, there is no need to 
discuss the political-question doctrine.” Id. 
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operations can be seen both as presenting political questions and as special 
factors counseling hesitation. 
It is helpful to recall the special factors analysis in Arar. The Second 
Circuit stated that the Canadian plaintiff’s challenge to his rendition to 
Syria required probing “deeply into the inner workings of the national 
security apparatus of at least three foreign countries, as well as that of the 
United States.”322 To the extent that such a suit proceeds, “the ability of the 
federal government to speak with one voice to its overseas counterparts is 
diminished, and the coherence and vitality of U.S. foreign policy called 
into question.”323 The latter quote is a clear invocation of Baker v. Carr’s 
sixth factor, “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”324 The district 
court in Arar quoted Baker on the same point, noting that then-Judge Scalia 
had brought it into play in Sanchez-Espinoza.325 
In the context of terrorism-related litigation, there is a particular 
District of Columbia Circuit case that merits discussion at this point. 
Schneider v. Kissinger was a damages action based on U.S. involvement in 
the assassination of a Chilean general as part of its attempt to destabilize 
the Allende regime.326 The circuit court’s rejection of this suit represents a 
“strong” version of the political question doctrine. Judge Sentelle’s opinion 
begins with Marbury’s recognition of a class of political acts327 and traces 
its evolution as a “limitation of the jurisdiction of the courts particularly 
applicable to foreign relations.”328 The opinion emphasizes the textual 
commitment of foreign relations and national security to the political 
branches.329 It also emphasizes the limited competence and role of the 
judiciary in such matters.330 Indeed, this seems the most significant part of 
the analysis. The court contrasts the broad commitments of these matters to 
 
 322. Arar, 532 F.3d at 181. 
 323. Id. at 182. 
 324. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 325. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281–82. 
 326. See Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 191–92 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (discussing the facts of 
the case). The case appears to have been based on common law tort theories rather than a Bivens theory. 
See id. at 196–97 (discussing the role of tort standards). 
 327. See id. at 193.  
 328. Id. (citing Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Corp., 246 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1918)). 
 329. See id. at 194–96. 
 330. See id. at 195–97. This is a recurring theme in national security litigation. See, e.g., Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that courts “lack the expertise and 
capacity to second-guess” the decision of the president, acting with congressional approval, to detain an 
enemy combatant).  
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the political branches by Articles I and II of the Constitution331 with the 
almost total absence of any such commitment to the judiciary in Article 
III,332 which “provides no authority for policymaking in the realm of 
foreign relations or provision of national security. It cannot then be denied 
that decision-making in the areas of foreign policy and national security is 
textually committed to the political branches.”333 
 The opinion is replete with minimization of the role of the courts. 
All they do, according to the opinion, is resolve cases and controversies; 
“recasting foreign policy and national security questions in tort terms does 
not provide standards for making or reviewing foreign policy 
judgments.”334 The logic of Schneider v. Kissinger, however, shows what 
happens when one starts down this road. It resembles the argument that an 
Article I commitment of a subject matter to Congress gives Congress a 
special, unreviewable competence in that area. If Article III courts, having 
no foreign affairs, military, or national security power, can only adjudicate 
cases and controversies, what happens when a duly presented case presents 
an issue in the field? Would there be an automatic abdication? As Robert 
Pushaw points out, “[I]f a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department raised a 
political question, then federal courts could never decide any claims against 
Congress or the President because the text of Articles I and II commits to 
them all legislative and executive powers.”335 
Thus, the entire war on terror could become a political question 
shielded from judicial review. That possibility may be particularly strong in 
matters that can be labeled military or foreign policy. As Pushaw reminds 
us, the “sobering example” of Korematsu looms over any such analysis.336 
 
 331. See Schneider, 412 F.3d at 194–95. 
 332. See id. at 195. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at 197. 
 335. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the 
Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1176 (2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (footnote omitted). The close relationship between the political question doctrine and 
Bivens’s special factors analysis is demonstrated by the fact that Justice Brennan made a similar 
argument in his United States v. Stanley dissent: “If a Bivens action were precluded any time Congress 
possessed a constitutional grant of authority to act in a given area, there would be no Bivens.” United 
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 707 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The political question doctrine is 
sharply criticized from a variety of perspectives. In addition to Pushaw’s excellent article, see Amanda 
L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333 (2006). With regard to Baker, 
Tyler states that “its prudential factors are even more problematic than its initial focus on constitutional 
text.” Id. at 368. 
 336. See Pushaw, supra note 335, at 1199 n.219. 
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The aspect of the political question doctrine that seems to be driving 
this analysis is the prudential aspect. The nonprudential notion of a 
textually demonstrable commitment of the matters at issue to the political 
branches is met by an equally strong textual commitment of cases and 
controversies to Article III courts, at least cases that common law courts 
traditionally hear. The Constitution provides judicially discernable and 
manageable standards. Perhaps issues of national security call for a 
prudential exercise of judicial discretion to stay out because of factors like 
the need for the nation to speak with one voice, but they raise the 
perplexing question of how to reconcile the existence of judicial power 
with refusals to exercise it. When jurisdiction is refused under one of the 
abstention doctrines, for example, there is presumably another tribunal 
available to hear the matter. However, when a case is dismissed without an 
alternate forum, a serious problem of rights without remedies arises under 
the political question and other nonjusticiability doctrines. 
The same problem can arise in war on terror Bivens actions, at least if 
the prudential-deferential model prevails. Focus on the subject matter 
diverts focus from the rights asserter, the rights asserted, and the fact that 
those rights are asserted in a traditional judicial proceeding. In the Bivens 
context, a nice example is furnished by Bush v. Lucas, one of the key early 
cases in the shift away from the Marbury-rights model. The Court conceded 
that “this case concerns a claim that a constitutional right has been 
violated,” but it stated that “the ultimate question on the merits in this case 
may appropriately be characterized as one of ‘federal personnel policy.’”337 
Both considerations—whether a question is “political” and whether 
“special factors” counsel hesitation—push the analysis toward separation 
of powers issues. The Court naturally looks at the prerogatives of the other 
branches. A high degree of deference often results—one which manifests 
itself not in an approach to the merits,338 but in a decision not to hear the 
case at all. The prudential-deferential approach, with its close resemblance 
to the political question doctrine, represents another example of a 
justiciability analysis. 
Thus, this approach to Bivens could lead to rejecting most war on 
terror claims on special factors grounds. I say “most” because there will be 
 
 337. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1983). Thus, a purported individual claim was recast 
as an attack on policy. Yet this duality will always be present in Bivens actions. 
 338. See Pushaw, supra note 335, at 1199. Pushaw’s general argument is to adopt a strong 
presumption of judicial review, but with “extraordinary deference to the elected branches” in areas such 
as military and foreign affairs. Id. This is one answer to the challenge of finding a middle ground, 
although it tilts strongly in the government’s favor. 
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cases at the margin that seem to involve mainly law enforcement issues 
without a close connection to the war on terror. This result is problematic, 
however, not in cases at the margin, but in cases at the center of the war on 
terror, where the constitutional claims are also at the center of individual 
rights protected by the Bill of Rights. Let us assume a case in which 
citizenship and place of injury are not relevant, and either the right is well 
established or the claim of right is highly plausible. In “heartland” Bivens 
actions arising out of the war on terror, will the Marbury-rights version of 
the doctrine make a comeback? 
B. THE MARBURY-RIGHTS MODEL AND WAR ON TERROR BIVENS ACTIONS 
1.  Is the Marbury-Rights Model Dead? 
The Marbury-rights model is not dead. Four Justices invoked it in the 
Malesko dissent.339 Even Justices Scalia and Thomas have stated they 
would apply “Bivens and its progeny [if] limited ‘to the precise 
circumstances that they involved.’”340 One needs to ask, however, why this 
model has fallen so far out of favor as to lead to a general perception that 
Bivens is of little force.341 As suggested earlier, a partial reason is that the 
1980s cases that established the ascendancy of the prudential-deferential 
model were generally strong candidates for a negative response to the 
Bivens question. They usually presented either an extensive remedial 
framework, as in Schweiker, or a subject matter with which the courts felt 
unfamiliar, such as internal military affairs in Chappell and perhaps 
Stanley. Bush may represent an example of both. While I and others have 
criticized these cases for insufficient emphasis on their constitutional 
dimensions,342 they show the power of the subject matter focus and the 
diversion from individual rights produced by special factors counseling 
hesitation. 
 
 339. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice 
Stevens was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The recent upsurge of interest among 
academics may play a role in the reconsideration and possible rebirth of this model. In particular, the 
article by Pfander and Baltmanis makes a strong case for a presumption in favor of a Bivens action. See 
Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 15 (manuscript at 8) (“[T]he federal courts should presume that a 
well-pleaded complaint, alleging an unconstitutional invasion of interests in life, liberty, and property, 
gives rise to an action for damages under Bivens.”). 
 340. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Malesko, 534 
U.S. at 75). 
 341. See In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[I]t would be 
fair to say that recognizing such a claim is clearly disfavored.”). 
 342. See Bandes, supra note 15; Brown, supra note 39. My present view is largely one of 
acceptance of these cases, particularly given their ramifications for the war on terror. 
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The three most recent cases were also somewhat weak candidates for 
the constitutional damages remedy. Meyer ran into the problem that “the 
logic of Bivens”343 supports a claim against individual employees, not the 
employing agency. The Court emphasized the importance of deterring 
individual officers344 and expressed concern about imposing “a potentially 
enormous financial burden for the Federal Government.”345 Malesko was a 
closer case. However, in denying a Bivens remedy against the private 
prison employer, the majority built on Meyer in finding a direct analogy to 
its attempt to hold the agency liable346 and again emphasized deterrence of 
individual employees.347 By the time the Court got to Wilkie, the notion of 
Bivens as a narrow doctrine—or at least as one that the Court continually 
refused to “extend”—had become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
In that case, the underlying claim raised what the Court called “a serious 
difficulty of devising a workable cause of action.”348 The opinion 
combined the latest statement of the prudential-deferential approach with 
the introduction of a balancing approach and an inconclusive attempt at 
applying it.349 After noting the difficulties involved, the Court basically 
punted the issue to Congress, which it described as “‘in a far better position 
than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation’ against 
those who act on the public’s behalf.”350 
In examining whether war on terror actions might be different enough 
to revive the Marbury-rights model and survive the special factors analysis, 
this Article will consider briefly what might be called “Bivens law” 
generally. This is not the only source of relevant doctrine, however. Since 
September 11, the Supreme Court has decided several important non-
Bivens war on terror cases. These cases have resulted in important victories 
for plaintiffs, as well as reaffirmations of the judicial role in protecting 
individual rights in times of national emergency.351 
Drawing first on Bivens law, it is important to note that to designate 
the entire war on terror as a special factor is perhaps a stretch beyond 
 
 343. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994). 
 344. See id. 
 345. Id. at 486. This reasoning supports the contention that the decision to impose entity liability 
should come from Congress. 
 346. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71 (2001). In comparing Malesko with 
Meyer, the majority went so far as to say, “This case is, in every meaningful sense, the same.” Id. 
 347. See id. at 69–71. 
 348. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007). 
 349. Tribe describes the Court’s balancing as “unconvincing.” See Tribe, supra note 15, at 71. 
 350. Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 562 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983)). 
 351. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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previously recognized contexts given that those contexts are both narrower 
and more specific. One might break the concept down into component parts 
such as “foreign affairs.” Even here, however, the courts are reluctant to 
paint with a broad brush that blocks off entire areas. The Supreme Court 
stated in Baker v. Carr that “it is error to suppose that every case or 
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial 
cognizance.”352 
Dissenting from the Second Circuit’s Arar decision, Judge Sack 
cautioned against a “blunderbuss” approach to war on terror Bivens actions 
“and the concomitant additional license it gives federal officials to violate 
constitutional rights with virtual impunity.”353 The point is reinforced when 
one considers that many of the actions will present “heartland”354 Bivens 
claims, such as searches like that in the original case or interrogation 
techniques that shock the conscience.355 Unless Bivens is overruled, some 
suits seem viable even under current law. Certainly, any such cases will 
severely test the strength of the war on terror as a special factor. Moreover, 
the Marbury-rights model may be on the verge of a comeback. The 
Supreme Court has recently, in a series of cases, reinforced the judiciary’s 
rights-protecting role, even in the face of action by the political branches. 
2.  Support for the Marbury-Rights Model from the Supreme Court’s War 
on Terror Cases 
Beginning in 2004, the Supreme Court decided a series of challenges 
to government confinement, classification, and trial of terrorism 
suspects.356 The Court regarded the cases as of the highest importance. The 
following quote from Justice Stevens is typical: “At stake in this case is 
nothing less than the essence of a free society. Even more important than 
the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their successors is the 
 
 352. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). It should be noted that the district court’s initial 
decision in Padilla v. Yoo shows that a highly case-specific inquiry can conclude that any such concerns 
are absent from a particular set of facts, even though that set of facts is closely related to the broader 
war on terror. 
 353. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 212–13 (2nd Cir.) (Sack, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part), reh’g en banc granted (Aug. 12, 2008). 
 354. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 78 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(contending that the Eighth Amendment claim “falls in the heartland of substantive Bivens claims”). 
 355. E.g., Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *15–17 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (discussing conditions of confinement claims), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 356. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
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character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule of 
law.”357 Although the government won some victories,358 the Court, 
whether by forced statutory construction or outright constitutional 
pronouncements, dealt it a series of setbacks. The cases called for a 
relatively wide-ranging procedure in habeas corpus proceedings,359 
extended habeas corpus to Guantanamo Bay,360 struck down the original 
military commissions,361 and mandated the availability of habeas for 
certain detainees despite statutory language to the contrary.362 
The Court was well aware of the tension between liberty and 
security,363 and of the need to respect the expertise of the political branches 
in matters of national security.364 Still, it came down squarely on the 
Marbury side of these issues, insisting on a substantial role for the 
judiciary. Benjamin Wittes, in writing of the pre-Boumediene decisions, 
discerns a  
chasm between the practical impact of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
this area so far and the potential implications of those decisions in the 
future—perhaps the near future—to justify more extensive judicial 
supervision of war making. Taken on their own, the Court’s 
pronouncements to date have been something less than dramatic. At the 
same time, they contain doctrinal seeds of a far more aggressive judicial 
posture . . . .365  
 
 357. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 358. E.g., id. at 450–51 (ordering dismissal of the habeas corpus petition as filed in the wrong 
district). In Hamdi, five Justices agreed that the president has some authority to detain individuals in the 
plaintiff’s position, Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517; id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting), and a plurality stated 
that “an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal” might be able to provide 
the necessary process, id. at 538 (plurality opinion). 
 359. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507. 
 360. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. 
 361. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557. 
 362. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 363. See id. at 2276–77. The Court recognized the tension between the need for executive 
authority when national security is threatened and “fidelity to freedom’s first principles.” Id. at 2277. 
Perhaps the best summation of the views of a majority of the Justices is the following: “The laws and 
Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security 
can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law.” Id. 
 364. See id. at 2276–77. The Court stated that  
proper deference must be accorded to the political branches. Unlike the President and some 
designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges 
begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its 
people. The law must accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain 
those who pose a real danger to our security. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 365. WITTES, supra note 22, at 104. According to Wittes, “[w]hat the Supreme Court has done is 
carve itself a seat at the table.” Id. at 15. 
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Boumediene marked a further step in this direction, both as a matter of 
rhetoric and of result. Citing Marbury, Boumediene cautioned against “a 
regime in which [Congress and the President], not this Court, say ‘what the 
law is.’”366 This view had earlier come across strongly in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, where the Court emphasized that the Constitution “most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties 
are at stake”367 and stated that “it does not infringe on the core role of the 
military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and 
constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like 
those presented here.”368 
Apart from the general thrust of the cases, there is an equally 
important, and more specific, dimension to their analysis: the special role 
of habeas corpus within the constitutional order. The Court’s first war on 
terror decisions all arose out of petitions for habeas corpus. The various 
opinions contain countless pages of historical analysis of the “Great Writ,” 
reaching back into English history.369 Habeas corpus is specifically 
guaranteed in the Constitution,370 while judicial review is not mentioned, 
let alone Bivens actions. The opinions emphasize the writ’s “centrality”371 
and that it secures the “chief” freedoms in our system, “freedom from 
arbitrary and unlawful restraint and . . . personal liberty.”372 The Court 
emphasizes the role of habeas corpus as “an indispensible mechanism for 
monitoring the separation of powers.”373 The judiciary is not just protecting 
 
 366. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803)). See David D. Cole, Rights over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo 
Bay, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47 (calling Boumediene a groundbreaking decision). 
 367. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). 
 368. Id. at 535. Hamdi can be seen as the Court’s first encounter with classic national security 
arguments in the context of war on terror litigation. The government invoked the “extraordinary 
constitutional interests at stake” and “[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited institutional 
capabilities of courts in matters of military decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict.” Id. 
at 527. Indeed, the court below had made the classic argument that the war powers are vested in the 
political branches by Articles I and II, and that Article III courts do not possess an analogous power. 
See id. at 514–15. The result in Hamdi gave something to both sides. The citizen detainee’s right to 
“basic” process was recognized. See id. at 534. At the same time, the decision affirmed the 
government’s power to detain citizen enemy combatants, limited the process that is due them, and in the 
plurality opinion, both suggested that the required standards could be met by “an appropriately 
authorized and properly constituted military tribunal,” id. at 538, and applied law-of-war principles to 
the war on terror, at least for now, see id. at 521. Still, the core of the analysis seems best reflected in 
the plurality’s statement that “we . . . reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers 
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances.” Id. at 535. 
 369. See, e.g., id. at 554–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 370. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 371. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2244. 
 372. Id. at 2277. 
 373. Id. at 2259. Boumediene, the only one of the cases to invalidate on constitutional grounds 
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individual freedoms; it is preventing the political branches from ganging up 
on unpopular groups, such as suspected terrorists.374  
These Supreme Court cases appear to give strong support to 
application of the Marbury-rights model of Bivens when the issue 
resurfaces in war on terror litigation.375 After all, the Court relied on a 
Marbury view of the legal system in that very context. Particularly 
important is the notion of the judicial branch as a check on the political 
branches in times when national security is threatened.376 Bivens actions 
can perform this same function, especially when the underlying conduct 
represents official policy, not the acts of a rogue official. 
There are other reasons for finding support for the Marbury-rights 
model. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, for example, abstention—a classic 
prudential doctrine—was available, but the Court rejected it.377 Overall, the 
Court’s normal deference to the political branches—a mainstay of the 
prudential-deferential model—disappeared when the Court apparently 
concluded that they had subordinated individual rights to national security 
and attempted to freeze the judiciary out of the process. 
 
action concurred in by both political branches, is replete with such references. See, e.g., id. at 2277. 
“Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of 
the law. The Framers decided that habeas corpus, a right of first importance, must be a part of that 
framework, a part of that law.” Id. “Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few 
exercises of judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to 
the authority of the Executive to imprison a person.” Id. 
 374. Although the focus of the cases is on measures taken by the executive branch, it must be 
emphasized that Congress acted to reinforce what the President had done. 
 375. See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809 JG SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *14 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (citing Hamdi for the proposition that national security concerns “do not 
warrant the elimination of remedies for . . . constitutional violations”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Iqbal 
v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 376. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004). Writing prior to Boumediene, Pushaw 
cautioned against a possible overreading of the cases expressing this principle. See generally Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic 
Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005 (2007). “As with the 2004 detention 
decisions . . . Hamdan is a setback for the President, but hardly the devastating blow imagined by many 
commentators. The Court has not plunged into a brave new world of bold judicial review.” Id. at 1077. 
He discusses the Constitution’s conferral of the war powers on the political branches and makes the 
important point that “the Framers and Ratifiers never mentioned what would happen if someone 
challenged the exercise of war powers not as inconsistent with Articles I or II, but rather as violating his 
or her individual legal rights.” Id. at 1023. Looking back over our history, he concludes: 
[T]he Justices have inevitably decided cases based not simply upon abstract rules of law, but 
also upon various political and practical considerations. Operating within these constitutional 
and pragmatic confines, the Court has tried to articulate and enforce individual rights and 
liberties to the extent possible, as it did recently in the “enemy combatant” litigation.  
Id. at 1081. 
 377. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 584–90 (2006). 
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It is true that the prudential-deferential language of lack of judicial 
competence, judicial interference, and the dangers of courts overseeing the 
military is present, but it is found mainly in the dissents.378 In Boumediene, 
Justice Scalia accused the Court of “an inflated notion of judicial 
supremacy.”379 Dissenting in Rasul v. Bush, he decried the decision as 
“forcing the courts to oversee one aspect of the Executive’s conduct of a 
foreign war.”380 Dissenting in Hamdan, Justice Thomas cited with approval 
President Bush’s finding that “the war on terror ushers in a new 
paradigm.”381 The Court, however, seemed to go out of its way to say that 
the Marbury paradigm has served us well and that Korematsu-like 
departures from it are the evil most to be feared. 
For present purposes, the key question is how easy the Court will find 
the conceptual step from habeas petitions to damages actions to be. As 
noted, the opinions present the writ as occupying a preferred position. 
Habeas is aimed at deprivation of liberty: what Blackstone, as quoted by 
Justice Scalia, described as “a more dangerous engine of arbitrary 
government” than other “gross and notorious [acts] of despotism.”382 While 
the habeas cases involve liberty, the damages cases will present questions 
of other rights as well. The Supreme Court cases on the former may shed 
little light on the latter.383 The issue did surface in Rasul. The end of the 
majority opinion discussed briefly, and positively, the possibility of 
nonhabeas actions being brought by noncitizens at Guantanamo.384 In 
dissent, Justice Scalia stated that Bivens actions could be brought as a result 
of the decision.385 
Indeed, the Court has recently suggested that Boumediene’s thrust 
extends beyond habeas corpus. In Rasul v. Myers, the D.C. Circuit rejected 
a Bivens suit arising out of conditions at Guantanamo, based in part on its 
view at that time that nonresident aliens outside the United States did not 
possess constitutional rights.386 The Supreme Court’s later decision in 
 
 378. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 379. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2302 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 380. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 499 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 381. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 691 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 382. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 555 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 131–33 (1765)). 
 383.  One can, of course, argue that deprivation of liberty and deprivation of rights are closely 
intertwined; the courts must be vigilant to protect against both. 
 384. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484. The Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act 
might cut off civil actions, although they appear to be limited to persons held as enemy combatants. 
 385. See id. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 386. See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 663–65 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) 
(mem.). 
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Boumediene established that such persons do possess the right to habeas 
corpus. When Myers came before it on certiorari, the Court granted the 
petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case “for further 
consideration in light of Boumediene v. Bush.”387 Still, it is far from clear 
that the Court will abandon the prudential-deferential model of Bivens 
when the inevitable war on terror cases come before it. After all, it has 
spent nearly three decades developing that approach. Given its bows in the 
direction of national security and the dangers of terrorism, the Court might 
find appealing a compromise legal regime for the war on terror—a new 
paradigm, so to speak, in which habeas corpus is a constant, but Bivens is 
not.388 Dissenting in Boumediene, Justice Scalia stated that “America is at 
war with radical Islamists” and argued that the decision “will make the war 
harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”389 
A Court anxious to preserve its political capital—the sort of response that 
prompted Alexander Bickel’s defense of the political question 
doctrine390—might be reluctant to take the step from habeas to Bivens. 
3.  The Bivens Impasse and Balancing as a Way Out 
Looking at the state of Bivens in 2009, there is some support for the 
Marbury-rights model, but the prudential-deferential model has prevailed 
for three decades. The result is an impasse, particularly in war on terror 
cases: the choice of model largely determines whether the suit proceeds. 
The Marbury-rights model inevitably highlights the importance of judicial 
vindication of individual constitutional rights (as well as the judiciary’s 
checking function) and triggers a presumption that the plaintiff should be 
heard. The prudential-deferential model points with equal strength to a 
hands-off approach to the war on terror. Echoes of the political question 
doctrine are clear in such concepts as lack of judicial capacity and the need 
for unhindered action by the political branches to formulate and execute 
policy to deal with a grave threat to national security. 
The courts will inevitably seek a way out of the Bivens impasse as war 
on terror suits force this choice on them with increasing frequency. They 
are likely to seek a solution that preserves Bivens in some form and is able 
 
 387. Rasul, 129 S. Ct. 763. 
 388. Wittes states, “I don’t doubt that the judiciary could open the door just a crack and entertain 
habeas claims but not others.” WITTES, supra note 22, at 116. He raises the prospect that the Court 
“could hold that detention differs so fundamentally from other exertions of governmental power that the 
Constitution specifically limits the power of Congress to suspend habeas corpus.” Id. 
 389. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
 390. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 183–98 (1962). 
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to distinguish between suits that “should” proceed and those that should 
not. This is a tall order. Courts may try to avoid the impasse by looking for 
answers outside of Bivens, in nonmerits doctrines such as immunity and 
state secrets, or in approaches to the merits such as “standards that resolve 
every doubt in favor of the validity of the government’s action.”391 Since 
many war on terror actions will be brought under Bivens, however, they 
cannot avoid confronting the impasse. 
4.  Balancing—An Illusory Compromise 
Some form of balancing might emerge as a potentially attractive 
compromise. On the plaintiff’s side, for example, the extent of alternative 
remedies diminishes the need for a judicial one to vindicate the underlying 
interest. Special factors analysis might be recast as a means of making sure 
the government’s interest in avoiding litigation is considered. Balancing 
was certainly explicit in Wilkie.392 The Court considered the interests on 
each side and then weighed reasons for and against what it described as “a 
workable cause of action.”393 
It is far from clear how much doctrinal impact Wilkie will have. 
Laurence Tribe is highly critical of the Court for “depart[ing] from the 
presumption of Bivens relief . . . into the realm of judicial balancing.”394 He 
views the Court as having moved into an “unhinged and uncabined 
balancing inquiry”395 that constitutes a “lawless and arbitrary” 
enterprise.396 Tribe writes from the perspective of a Marbury-rights purist, 
but a return to that model is far from a sure thing, either in general or in the 
specific context of the war on terror. It is, however, the case that balancing 
tests are often criticized for not providing “clear guidance about what 
behavior is permitted.”397 
 
 391. Pushaw, supra note 335, at 1199 (proposing a standard in the political question context for 
“military or foreign affairs decisions that allegedly violate individual legal rights”). 
 392. Perhaps balancing was already implicit in Bivens cases prior to Wilkie. See Nichol, supra 
note 41, at 1150 (discussing Schweiker as a possible balancing case); Tribe, supra note 15, at 67 (same). 
Balancing was explicit in McCarthy v. Madigan on the issue of exhaustion where the Court made an 
“evaluation of the individual and institutional interests at stake in [the] case.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 
503 U.S. 140, 152 (1992), superseded by statute, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, sec. 803(d), § 7(a), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 (1996). 
 393. E.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 555 (2007). 
 394. Tribe, supra note 15, at 76. 
 395. Id. at 70.  
 396. Id. at 71. 
 397. Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 646 (1988). McFadden’s 
view is that balancing tests may resolve the particular litigation before the court, but that they fail “to 
guide future behavior.” Id. 
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Moreover, balancing seems inconsistent with the concept of 
justiciability. In the context of war on terror Bivens suits, the use of special 
factors analysis is best seen as a doctrine of justiciability. The resemblance 
to the political question doctrine reinforces this point. For justiciability 
purposes, the strength of the plaintiff’s claim is not determinative of the 
structural, separation of powers–based question of whether the courts 
should hear it at all. 
If the prudential-deferential model is reaffirmed in the war on terror 
context, this can be seen as the result of a generalized balancing. The 
plaintiff’s ability to assert rights is something of a constant as long as the 
claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.398 However, the 
government’s interest in untrammeled prosecution of the war on terror 
would outweigh whatever interests the plaintiff might present. No 
particularized inquiry into how the war on terror would be affected is 
necessary or desirable. In a Fourth Amendment surveillance case, the 
Supreme Court described the operation of balancing in the following terms: 
“[O]ur task is to examine and balance the basic values at stake in this case: 
the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential 
danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free 
expression.”399 In Bivens cases, the choice of model takes the competing 
values into account and answers the problem. The balancing has taken 
place in the choice. It is the fact that one cannot have it both ways that 
creates the impasse. 
Rejection of balancing means rejection of a filtering device that 
would, in theory, allow some war on terror Bivens suits to proceed. But it is 
difficult to come up with a test that identifies which ones “should” proceed 
in light of the constants on both sides. Not only is there no balancing, but 
also under the prudential-deferential model, issues such as immunity and 
state secrets will not arise. The suit is dismissed at the threshold. It can 
certainly be argued that these two defenses—treating the privilege as a 
defense—lead to more nuanced adjudication in which filtering does take 
place. Moreover, consideration of the state secrets privilege represents a 
form of balancing in which one of the government’s most important 
 
 398. In Iqbal v. Hasty, the court of appeals stated in a conditions of confinement case that  
most of the rights that the Plaintiff contends were violated do not vary with surrounding 
circumstances, such as the right not to be subjected to needlessly harsh conditions of 
confinement, the right to be free from the use of excessive force, and the right not to be 
subjected to ethnic or religious discrimination. The strength of our system of constitutional 
rights derives from the steadfast protection of those rights in both normal and unusual times. 
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 
(2009). 
 399. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314–15 (1972). 
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interests in protecting the war on terror is considered. Using Bivens as a 
wholesale dismissal device sweeps too broadly, insulates the executive 
branch, and prevents adjudication of some of the most important 
constitutional issues of our time. My response to these arguments is 
twofold. First, a workable balancing test for special factors analysis seems 
hard to devise. For example, how would courts measure the importance to 
the war on terror of particular governmental measures? Any such inquiry, 
like that in Padilla v. Yoo, raises issues of judicial intrusiveness and of 
close scrutiny of war on terror decisions through highly case-specific 
analysis. The prudential-deferential model asks whether the defendant’s 
actions are plausibly viewed as part of the government’s antiterrorism 
efforts. If so, a special factor is present. Second, adoption of a balancing 
test seems to require a presumption of the availability of relief. Rather than 
a compromise “third way” approach, this seems essentially a thinly 
disguised adoption of the Marbury-rights model. 
A final word on balancing is in order given this Article’s focus on the 
war on terror. The concept plays a central role in Judge Richard Posner’s 
recent book Not a Suicide Pact.400 Posner discusses balancing extensively, 
although not in the specific context of Bivens actions. His central thesis is 
that courts must permit civil liberties to “vary with the threat level.”401 “In 
times of danger, the weight of concerns for public safety increases relative 
to that of liberty concerns, and civil liberties are narrowed.”402 Posner’s 
analysis specifically calls for balancing and invokes an analytical approach 
based more on flexible standards than on rules.403 Does Posner’s analysis 
strengthen the case for balancing as a way out of the Bivens impasse in the 
context of the war on terror? In this specific context, his thesis points in the 
same direction as the prudential-deferential model, with the war on terror 
viewed as a special factor. As a result, Posnerian balancing would make no 
difference. On a more general level, it is helpful to see current Bivens 
doctrine as essentially one of justiciability. Posner’s view of varying rights 
seems to be aimed more at merits questions and similar issues. It may, for 
example, have an important role to play in non-Bivens cases, such as 
determining the validity of governmental surveillance on a motion to 
suppress evidence in a criminal trial. 
 
 400. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY (2006). 
 401. Id. at 7. 
 402. Id. at 9. 
 403. See, e.g., id. at 31, 35, 39, 41. For a critique of Posner, see Lobel, supra note 205, at 1435–
38. 
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Of course, it would be possible to revert to the Marbury-rights model 
(so that the plaintiff presumptively gets heard) and apply Posner’s approach 
to the merits (so that the plaintiff almost always loses).404 I am not sure that 
this is a substantial step beyond the current Bivens impasse. Posner’s 
analysis does help us see that at the root of the prudential-deferential model 
is a form of balancing, even if it will probably be applied as a rule of 
justiciability in the war on terror. We can see more clearly what is going 
on, but the impasse is still there. Courts must still choose between the two 
conflicting models, and the choice of model resolves the case. Just as 
balancing is not the answer, it may be that the courts are not the place to 
look for it. 
V.  THE ROLE OF CONGRESS—ALTERNATIVES TO BIVENS 
The general arguments for congressional action in war on terror issues 
certainly apply in the specific context of the Bivens impasse. The war on 
terror will generate a large number of constitutional claims. The notion that 
the legal system will not even grant a hearing to apparent victims such as 
Maher Arar is troubling. For many, it runs counter to deeply held notions of 
justice. Yet a broad range of war on terror Bivens suits certainly presents 
the risk that Wittes invokes: a regime “in which legalisms pervasively 
hamper governmental pursuit of a goal that nearly all Americans 
support”405—in other words, a regime of counter-counter-terrorism via 
lawsuit. Absent legislation, the issue will ultimately be decided by the 
Supreme Court.406 Since balancing is not a realistic option, the Court will 
be forced to confront the impasse and decide which model prevails in war 
on terror litigation. 
Let us proceed from the premise that Congress should act. Can it act 
to resolve the Bivens impasse? The answer will depend, for some, on which 
way it tilts. Advocates of a strong judicial role in rights enforcement407 will 
contend that only a legislative endorsement of the Marbury-rights model 
will pass constitutional muster. Yet even the original Bivens decision 
 
 404. This would be somewhat similar to Pushaw’s suggested deferential approach to individual 
rights cases posing political questions. Deference is not automatic victory for the government, but it 
does seem to come close. 
 405. WITTES, supra note 22, at 150. 
 406. In its present posture, Arar is a strong candidate. One can expect a sharply divided decision 
from the en banc Second Circuit. 
 407. See generally Bandes, supra note 15 (developing the notion of a self-executing Constitution). 
The view of Pfander and Baltmanis that Congress has effectively ratified the Bivens remedy permits 
analysis to stop short of the notion of a self-executing Constitution. See, e.g., Pfander & Baltmanis 
supra note 15 (manuscript at 30) (“Congress has now ratified the Bivens remedy . . . .”). 
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clearly contemplated a superior role for Congress that is inconsistent with 
the notion of a constitutional command automatically accompanied by 
judicial enforcement. The second exception indicated the Court would 
defer to an “explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a 
federal officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover 
money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another 
remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress.”408 The first 
exception—“special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress”409—apparently contemplated the 
possibility of some supervening congressional role as well. The Court’s 
development of the first exception, including the conflation of the second 
with it, is based on notions of legislative superiority. Moreover, the 
conceptual view of Bivens as federal common law410 reinforces Congress’s 
ability to act, whether by choosing the Marbury-rights model or a different 
approach. 
At this point, I wish to explore possible legislative approaches. 
Congress certainly could choose the Marbury-rights model, in part based 
on the view that the Court has moved too far in the opposite direction. 
Thus, we might see a counterpart to § 1983 for federal officials—a true 
analogue that could include redress for statutory as well as constitutional 
violations.411 Such a statute could deal with ancillary matters, such as 
indemnification and attorney’s fees.412 The courts would have to grapple 
with a host of interpretative questions, including the extent to which the 
new statue incorporated the existing body of § 1983 law, which is quite 
extensive, and the status of existing Bivens precedents. The state secrets 
privilege—not present in § 1983 suits—would be a problem. However, the 
principal issue would be one of policy: Does Congress wish to choose the 
Marbury-rights model in the face of the burdens it places on the war on 
terror? Is there a different, and better, way out of the impasse? 
I think there is in the form of entity liability. In the context of torture, 
Seamon makes the case for entity liability as follows: 
[T]he United States should be civilly liable for at least some torture 
inflicted by people acting under color of federal law. That belief rests on 
the view . . . that torture typically results from systemic problems; it is 
 
 408. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 
(1971). 
 409. Id. at 396.  
 410. See generally Monaghan, supra note 189 (discussing the concept of “constitutional common 
law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress”). 
 411. See Seamon, supra note 7, at 803. 
 412. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (providing for the award of attorney’s fees). 
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seldom the sole result of “a few bad apples.” It is therefore fair for the 
system to bear responsibility for the torture. Awards of money judgments 
in civil actions are an appropriate way to hold the government 
responsible for torture. They compensate torture victims (to the extent 
their injuries are compensable). They symbolically represent the United 
States’ acknowledgement of responsibility, as determined by an 
independent judiciary. And, the threat of civil liability may encourage 
the government to adopt measures to prevent torture by its officials.413  
The same point can be made generally with respect to collateral 
damage from the war on terror.414 The drafting of a statute to achieve this 
goal presents several challenges. I will assume that one of the problems 
with Bivens in its present form is the imposition of individual liability, 
despite Pillard’s analysis that “[t]he federal government has become the 
real defendant party in interest in Bivens litigation.”415 Certainly the Court 
has proceeded on the assumption of individual liability. One approach to an 
entity liability statute is to build on § 1983. Seamon proposes a statute that 
would be substantially identical to it and would establish a cause of action 
against “persons.”416 
Entity liability would come in through an analogy to § 1983’s precept 
that local governments are liable for customs or policies that cause 
constitutional violations.417 This proposal retains individual liability, which 
can be criticized on the classic grounds of effect on individual zeal and 
judicial supervision of war on terror policies via tort suits. More to the 
point, it seems an indirect method of establishing entity liability. A statute 
that comes out and says what it is doing probably stands a better chance of 
achieving its goals than one that relies on indirection and judicial adoption 
of policies established in another context.418 
 
 413. Seamon, supra note 7, at 759–60 (footnotes omitted). 
 414. Thomas Madden and his colleagues made this point in 1983, before liability issues focused 
on the war on terror: 
 Most observers believe, and we agree, that to most effectively serve the primary goals of 
compensation, deterrence, and fairness in dealing with alleged constitutional violations by 
federal officials, and to afford a solution to the problems perceived to flow from the current 
system of individual liability, Congress should replace liability of individual officials with 
governmental liability for constitutional wrongs done in the public’s name. 
Thomas J. Madden, Nicholas W. Allard & David H. Remes, Bedtime for Bivens: Substituting the 
United States as Defendant in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 475 (1983). 
 415. Pillard, supra note 22, at 67. Pillard appears to concede that litigation has some effect on the 
defendant officials. Id. at 97 n.137. Moreover, a new administration could change policies on such 
matters as indemnification. 
 416. See Seamon, supra note 7, at 759. 
 417. See id. at 760. 
 418. This should not be taken as a criticism of Seamon’s excellent article, probably the definitive 
work on the subject. His preference for building on § 1983 is certainly understandable given the 
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An alternative approach is to build on the existing system of 
compensation for government wrongs: the FTCA.419 Writing in the context 
of the war on terror, one commentator states that “Congress should 
substitute the United States as the proper defendant in constitutional tort 
actions. The amendment to the FTCA would expand the statute’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity to make the United States liable in money damages for 
constitutional torts committed by its employees.”420 Under current law, the 
“FTCA’s incorporation of state tort law limits recovery against the 
government for tort-like violations of individual constitutional rights to 
situations in which state law recognizes an analogous negligent or 
intentional tort.”421 
Amending the FTCA has the advantage of directness, but it brings 
with it a host of problems, particularly in the context of war on terror 
Bivens suits. For example, as Seamon points out, the Act contains 
exceptions both for combatant activities and for claims arising in a foreign 
country.422 Most problematic is the “discretionary function” exception.423 
The general view is that “[a]n FTCA claim will not lie for ‘an act or 
omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the 
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or 
regulation be valid.’”424 The Supreme Court has stated that it was not the 
purpose of Congress to test constitutional issues through tort suits.425 Thus, 
 
numerous problems he identifies with using the FTCA, discussed immediately below. Moreover, the 
concept of combining individual and entity liability is in harmony with the views expressed by the 
Court in Carlson. At this point, it makes sense to keep all legislative options on the table. A recent 
comment states that: 
If courts continue to dismiss torture lawsuits under existing law, Congress could create a 
cause of action against government officials by amending the [Torture Victims Protection 
Act] so that it imposes liability for torture committed under domestic U.S. law. Alternatively, 
to allow suits against the U.S. government, it could amend the FTCA or create a federal 
analogue to the civil rights statute, [§ 1983] . . . .  
Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1158, 1166–67 (2009). 
 419. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
 420. Note, New Life for a Good Idea: Revitalizing Efforts to Replace the Bivens Action with a 
Statutory Waiver of the Sovereign Immunity of the United States for Constitutional Torts Suits, 71 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (2003). 
 421. JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 1124 (5th ed. 2003). 
 422. See Seamon, supra note 7, at 732–37. It has been stated that “the morass of FTCA exceptions 
is likely to swallow most possible torture claims.” Developments in the Law, supra note 418, at 1160. 
 423. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
 424. PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE’S 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1279 (10th ed. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)). 
 425. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 27–30 (1953). See also Seamon, supra note 7, at 
749 (discussing the discretionary function exception and raising the possibility that lower-level officials 
would be liable, but not high-level policymakers). 
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an approach that builds on the FTCA will encounter a number of problems 
in the war on terror context, although careful drafting can perhaps resolve 
some of them. Indeed, building on the existing FTCA structure without 
taking into account the numerous pitfalls could result in removing 
individual liability without substituting entity liability. How to preserve the 
presumed deterrent effect of Bivens raises a further issue.426 Finally, it 
should be noted that the FTCA is a complex statute that has generated a 
complex body of law. Amending it to deal with the war on terror may have 
serious unintended consequences in other areas.427 
The two approaches to entity liability discussed above are certainly 
possibilities for Congress to consider if it seeks a way out of the Bivens 
impasse. Either approach, admittedly, leaves unresolved the problem of 
judicial intrusion on the policies and operational aspects of the war on 
terror. After all, judgment for the plaintiff would rest on a finding of 
unconstitutional action by one or more government officials. A partial 
response is to cap the amount of damages allowable. The plaintiff would 
get some relief and the government would avoid what the Court called, in 
denying a Bivens action against a federal agency, “a potentially enormous 
financial burden.”428 Paying for collateral damage would become part of 
the cost of waging the war on terror. 
Let us consider, however, two alternatives. The first is to make 
hearing Bivens claims part of the jurisdiction of any new national security 
court. There have been a number of proposals for such a court, centered on 
detention and related issues.429 Such a court, however, might develop a 
broad range of expertise in matters related to terrorism. For example, 
Chesney has suggested that suits that would otherwise be dismissed on 
state secrets privilege grounds could be transferred “to a classified judicial 
forum for further proceedings.”430 Of course, any such approach still raises 
 
 426. See Madden et al., supra note 414, at 471 (recommending the “establishment of an 
independent administrative disciplinary board”). 
 427. Other issues may arise. Pre–war on terror efforts to substitute the FTCA for Bivens foundered 
on the issue of immunity for the government if the individual would be immune. See id. at 479–86. 
 428. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). 
 429. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Opening Statement, Suspected Terrorists: Domestic Terror 
Courts Are Waiting!, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 357 (2008); Neal Katyal, A National Security 
Court: Not Now, Not Yet, GEO. SEC. L. COMMENT., Oct. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.securitylawbrief.com/commentary/2008/10/a-national-secu.html (“[T]here are literally 
hundreds of different models from which to choose . . . .”). 
 430. Chesney, supra note 216, at 1313. Indeed, Jack Goldsmith has stated that “[o]thers might 
want a national security court to examine other areas of law, such as those civil cases in which the ‘state 
secrets’ privilege is invoked to block litigation.” Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term Terrorist Detention and 
Our National Security Court 15 n.45 (Feb. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Brookings 
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the issue of judicial pronouncements on war on terror policies. 
Perhaps courts are not the answer. Both the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York and Human Rights Watch have recommended the 
establishment of a compensation system outside the judicial process.431 The 
Bar Association states that 
a system can be devised that would compensate victims of torture and 
cruel or inhuman treatment, while deterring the initiation of frivolous 
claims and minimizing evidentiary problems inherent in protecting state 
secrets. An independent administrative agency to handle such claims 
could develop an expertise in the handling of such claims; pleading 
standards and procedures for summary dismissal might be developed to 
weed out frivolous claims; costs could be imposed for claims that prove 
to have been filed without a reasonable basis; procedures to address the 
government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege could be 
adopted . . . and liability could be limited to the United States, thereby 
excluding damage claims against individual personnel.432 
There are a variety of nonjudicial options for Congress to consider. In 
addition to the claims commission model, there is considerable interest in 
the possibility of a congressionally created “Truth and Reconcilation 
Commission,”433 which would examine U.S. war on terror policies. Its 
mandate might include awarding compensation to innocent victims of those 
policies.434 Thus, there are a number of legislative options. In line with 
Wittes’s view, I look to Congress for a way out of the impasse. Yet one 
must recognize that Congress may do nothing, leaving matters in the hands 
of the courts. As the analysis in this Article suggests, there are strong 
arguments for both models, reflecting the duality of the original Bivens 
decision. Ultimately a case like Arar will reach the Supreme Court. One 
can predict a split decision, but not much more than that. If the Court 
leaves matters where they are—adhering to the prudential-deferential 
 
Institution), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/ 
0209_detention_goldsmith/0209_detention_goldsmith.pdf. 
 431. See ASS’N OF BAR OF CITY OF N.Y., REAFFIRMING THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO COMMON 
ARTICLE 3 OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 49 (2008); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FIGHTING TERRORISM 
FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY 22 (2008). 
 432. ASS’N OF BAR OF CITY OF N.Y., supra note 431, at 49. 
 433. See Developments in the Law, supra note 418, at 1168 (noting the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa). After rejecting “sweeping civil and criminal liability for Bush 
administration officials,” Peter Margulies states that “[a] bipartisan truth commission focused on 
transparency, not blame, would better serve American interests. As in all responses to the Bush 
administration’s excesses, the politics of pay-back should bow to the imperative of problem-solving.” 
Margulies, supra note 295, at 7. 
 434. See Developments in the Law, supra note 418, at 1168. 
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model—Congress seems unlikely to act. The contrary result—exposing 
American officials to counter-counter-terrorism via lawsuit—seems more 
likely to provoke action. Ironically, the best way to get Congress to provide 
something other than the Marbury-rights model is for the Court to adopt it. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is no ideal solution to the issues raised in this Article. The war 
on terror will increasingly generate suits by terrorism suspects who seek 
damages for the governmental conduct to which they have been subjected. 
Many of these suits will be based on the Bivens doctrine, which permits 
damages actions for constitutional torts committed by federal officials. This 
Article contends that the Bivens doctrine exists in two forms: the Marbury-
rights model and the prudential-deferential model. The former focuses on 
the plaintiff and points toward allowing the suit to proceed. The latter 
focuses on the subject matter and leads to emphasis on protecting the 
government. It has become a form of justiciability doctrine, closely related 
to the political question doctrine, and has prevailed since the 1980s. 
War on terror Bivens plaintiffs face obstacles, but they are not 
insurmountable. The Supreme Court’s recent habeas corpus cases in the 
context of the war on terror have emphasized a heightened judicial role in 
protecting individual rights. One cannot say which model the Court will 
choose. Bivens represents an impasse: a difficult, if not impossible, choice 
between abandoning judicial protection of constitutional rights in order to 
shield the war on terror and judicial oversight of the war on terror via tort 
suits in order to protect those rights. The difficulty of the choice also 
reflects the deep division within our society over how to strike the balance 
between individual liberty and national security. 
This Article contends that in the context of the war on terror judicial 
application of the prudential-deferential model makes the most sense. 
Intrusion via tort suits on the difficult policy choices involved presents a 
high risk, and it is questionable whether “the civil courts may provide a 
kind of alternate truth commission, through the process of legal 
discovery.”435 Moreover, the ability to bring a Bivens action has never been 
 
 435. Schwartz, supra note 203. I admit that my optimal solution is at variance with the view of the 
constitutional order put forward by Fallon and Meltzer in Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, 
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991). I favor 
compensation, but not necessarily from a court. This is at variance with what they refer to as the 
“Marbury principle” of remediation by a court “for all constitutional violations,” an aspirational goal 
that the system will not always achieve. Id. at 1778–79. They view as even more important “an overall 
system of remedies that is effective in maintaining a regime of lawful government.” Id. at 1779. In the 
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an absolute right, or anything close to it. Still, Congress can and should 
take the legal system beyond the impasse. Entity liability has the potential 
of compensating victims while protecting the war on terror from death by 
lawsuit. It is far from clear that Congress will act. Perhaps the Court will 
force its hand.436 
 
war on terror context, my approach looks to the possibility of the political branches policing themselves 
to some extent. Obviously, there would still be lawsuits of many different kinds, both by and against the 
government (and its officials), which would raise constitutional issues. Bivens suits, however, would not 
be among them. Those who disagree with the views put forth in this Article are likely to view Bivens 
suits as essential both for remediation and as a constitutional check on the political branches. In the 
latter capacity, they can be seen as using the courts to provide an important accountability mechanism; 
apart from plaintiffs’ status as wronged individuals, they function as private attorneys general. See 
Zaring, supra note 22, at 366. 
 436. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies: The Newfound National Security 
Exception to Bivens, 28 A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP., July 2006, at 1, 5 (“Congress, as the 
instrument of popular sentiment, is the least likely to look out for the rights of those swept up in the 
proverbial dragnet, and is the least willing to create remedies for constitutional violations to the news of 
which we have become too accustomed.”). Vladeck is strongly critical of the lower courts’ decisions in 
Arar. The same issue of the REPORT contains a defense of Arar by Julian Ku. See Julian Ku, Why 
Constitutional Rights Litigation Should Not Follow the Flag, 28 A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP., July 
2006, at 1. 
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